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SUPREME COURT REVIEW
FOREWARD: MONTANA V. EGELHOFFREFLECTIONS ON THE LIMITS OF
LEGISLATIVE IMAGINATION AND
JUDICIAL AUTHORITY
RONALD J. AUXEN*
Editor's note: This article is the result of an experiment conducted by Prof.
Allen, the Journal,and the CrimprofList Server on the Internet. Prof.Allen
posted the manuscript of this articleon the list alongwith an open invitation to
list members to discuss the article. What resulted was a unique open debate
among prominent commentators about the article prior to its publication. We
have appended this debate at the conclusion of the article. With the exception of
minorspelling andfont changes, we have left the messages as they were sent out
on the list, to preserve theflavor of the debate as much as possible.
The Journal wishes to thank the members of the CrimprofList, and in
particularStephen Sowle, the list owner,for their help with this project.
To explore aspects of perception, psychologists use ambiguous
pictures. One I remember from my childhood was, if looked at one
way, two candlesticks side by side; looked at another, it was two elderly
women staring at each other. The law has its own ambiguous pictures,
primarily formed through the use of presumptions. Consider a cause
of action defined in terms of negligence, which requires the taking of
a risk a reasonable person would have perceived. Add that the violation of a safety statute creates a presumption of negligence and, voila,
an ambiguous picture. Looked at one way, a plaintiff must prove negligence to recover, and violation of a safety statute is an indication of
negligence; looked at another, a plaintiff must prove either negligence or the violation of a safety statute, regardless of negligence, to
recover. As Montana v. Egelhoff demonstrates, other kinds of eviden* John Henry Wigmore Professor, Northwestern University School of Law.

1 116 S. Ct. 2013 (1996).
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tiary rules and substantive definitions of liability can also create ambiguous pictures. When they do, if Egelhoff is typical, the resulting
constitutional analysis is likely to be ambiguous, as well.
The case involves a reasonable legislative judgment, to-wit alcohol
is generally speaking not mitigating of criminality. This judgment, regrettably, was contained in a curiously written state statute that says:
45-2-203. Responsibility-intoxicated condition. A person who is in an
intoxicated condition is criminally responsible for his conduct and an
intoxicated condition is not a defense to any offense and may not be
taken into consideration in determining the existence of a mental state
which is an element of the offense unless the defendant proves that he
did not know that it was an intoxicating substance when he consumed,
smoked, sniffed,
injected, or otherwise ingested the substance causing
2
the condition.
This statute has four components:
1. An intoxicated person is criminally responsible for his conduct.
This is not a surprise. That a person consumes alcohol prior to committing a bank robbery is hardly grounds for sympathy.
2. Intoxication is not a defense to criminality. See above.
3. Intoxication "may not be taken into consideration in determining
the existence of a mental state which is an element of the offense."
What, exactly, does this mean? Is this simply a rule of evidence that
excludes one category of evidence from consideration in determining
mental elements? Or read in conjunction with point one above, is it
instead a substantive rule that defines liability as either an act with all
the requisite elements, including mental elements, or as a result (in
this case death) caused by an intoxicated individual? In large measure, the opinions in Egeihoff are disputing which of these characterizations to give to the statute, thus converting the statute into a
constitutional version of an ambiguous picture. There are, however,
other matters that should have been discussed as well. More on this
below.
4. Intoxication may not be taken into consideration "unless the defendant proves that he did not know that it was an intoxicating substance when he consumed, smoked, sniffed, injected, or otherwise
ingested the substance causing the condition." The statute makes unintentional intoxication an affirmative defense, although it fails to
specify the burden of persuasion by which a defendant must "prove
that he did not know." In some other case, this will be the basis of an
appeal. It played no role in Egelhoff and I put it aside.
I asserted above that the Montana statute is curiously written.
2 MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-203 (1995) (as amended in 1987), quoted in Montana v.
Egelhoff, 900 P.2d 260, 264 (Mont. 1995).
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Perhaps more accurate would be that it reflects a simplistic and unreflective solution to a real problem, one that creates as many problems
as it solves. The obvious objective of the legislature was to ensure that
violent and antisocial acts committed by individuals under the influence would not go unpunished. This objective could have been accomplished directly by providing liability for harmful acts done while
intoxicated, and punishment could have been tailored both to the seriousness of the result and the level of intoxication. This would have
facilitated examining the extent to which the legislature wished to create a strict liability offense. Instead, in an obvious failure of the legal
imagination,3 the legislature simply added on a quick-fix provision to
the extant criminal code, neglecting the incompatibility between the
traditional structure of the criminal law and the quick fix. It is out of
that incompatibility that the constitutional issues emerge. To analyze
that incompatibility requires that we ask first What exactly did the
Montana Legislature do? If the answer is ambiguous, we must proceed to ask: Does it matter?
WHAT EXACTLY DID THE MONTANA LEGISLATURE

Do?

Quite dearly, the Montana legislature was attempting to implement the judgment that, generally speaking, consumption of alcohol
is irrelevant to criminality. This appears to have been an attempt to
head off arguments that a person was deserving of special consideration because she was drunk at the time she committed the otherwise
criminal act. Such arguments could be founded either on the view
that the alcohol impaired the person's normal capacity for self-control, and thus mercy is in order, or alternatively that in fact an element-in particular a mental state-was not present, and thus that
the act did not meet the legal requirements of criminality. In either
event, the obvious target of the legislature was the person who,
although perhaps "drunk," nonetheless is-or at least appears to bein sufficient control of himself as to know at the time what he is doing:
A gun is brandished, pointed and fired; it did not go off as the consequence of physical forces involving no directed human action. The
argument for leniency is that "at the time" the person was not behaving as he normally would precisely because of his intoxicated state,
and thus that the acts are more like that of a madman or are under
the control of the alcohol rather than that of the personality of the.
perpetrator. The perpetrator may not even remember the events in
question. In any event, the appeal to mercy is essentially that "That
was not me who did the act. My will was subverted (in one way or
3 See genera/y ALAN WATSON, FAiLURES OF THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (1988).
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another) by the alcohol. I would never have done this were I sober."
To which the legislature responded: Tough luck. The problem is that
the response is considerably broader than that, and highly ambiguous.
The two points are inextricably woven together.
The statute could be understood as defining liability as either the
articulated elements or simply as drunkenness coupled with articulated consequences. Either would suffice. This construction, which I
will call the substantive interpretation, is the natural reading of the
phrase "A person who is in an intoxicated condition is criminally responsible for his conduct." A person who is in an intoxicated condition was criminally responsible for his conduct under the law prior to
this change, so long as the necessary elements were present. Thus,
the language easily bears the interpretation that a person is liable for
his harmful conduct even if,
because of alcohol, some mental requirement is not satisfied. Otherwise, the statute would be superfluous.
Under this interpretation of the statute, murder would be the intentional killing (knowledge or purpose in Montana) of another human
being through a voluntary act or death caused by a person who at the
time was intoxicated.
There is another way to read the statute, however, which is why it
is an ambiguous picture. The other way to read the statute, which is
the evidentiary interpretation, is that it is merely a rule of evidence
excluding evidence of intoxication on issues of mental states. This
seems to be the most natural reading of the language "an intoxicated
condition is not a defense to any offense and may not be taken into
consideration in determining the existence of a mental state which is
an element of the offense." Under this reading, the formal elements
of liability remain the same, but one type of evidence may not be used
to disprove them-evidence of intoxication. Thus, the prosecution
would still have to "prove" all the requisite elements of murder beyond reasonable doubt, such as a voluntary act done with the "purpose" to bring about the death, or "knowing" that it was likely to
occur, but the defendant could not respond to the prosecution's case
with evidence of intoxication that tended to disprove any of these
mental elements.
The Montana Supreme Court concluded that the second interpretation was correct, that the legislature simply enacted a rule of evidence rather than changed the legal elements. The Supreme Court
divided on this question, with Justice Ginsburg concurring in upholding the statute on the ground that it was an acceptable redefinition of
the offense of murder.4 In an opinion for the plurality, Justice Scalia
4 Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2024 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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agreed but on the ground that there is no difference between an evidentiary rule and a substantive redefinition. 5 The dissenters, by contrast, were quite clear that the statute was a rule of evidence, and,
regardless whether the legislature could have redefined the crime to
achieve the same outcome, the rule as it stood violated the
6
Constitution.
So, the answer to the first question-what exactly did the Montana legislature do?-really is ambiguous. It either redefined the substantive contours of the statute, or it provided a rule of evidence. So
we must proceed to the next question: Does it matter?
DoF-s IT MATrm?
What exactly the Montana legislature did unmistakably makes a
difference to a defendant, although whether that pragmatic difference raises constitutional questions is ambiguous. Egelhoff does not
provide much assistance in answering the constitutional question,
however, because both Ginsburg's and Scalia's apparent view of the
meaning of the statute verge on incoherent. I discuss these two points
in turn, and in the remainder of the essay discuss what I believe to be
the salient issues emerging from the case.
Consider first how the different interpretations of the Montana
statute have the capacity to generate different outcomes, although in
some cases the results might be the same. Under the substantive interpretation, a person who happens to be drunk, but still sufficiently
in possession of her senses so that there is sufficient cognitive activity
to permit willed bodily movements (voluntary act) and intent to commit, even if stupidly and later regretfully, the natural and probable
consequences of those acts is simply out of luck. But so, too, apparently, is the person completely lacking even minimal cognitive activity.
Like an irrebuttable presumption of negligence from the violation of
a safety statute or the irrebuttable presumption of paternity when a
child is born to a couple during wedlock, the finding of a' death
caused by a drunken individual would be murder. End of story.
Thus, the state would not have to show any (othei) evidence of any
mental state. If the evidentiary exclusion interpretation is adopted, a
much different situation is presented. Sufficient evidence of voluntariness and intentionality would have to be adduced to permit a finding of these elements beyond reasonable doubt, and the defendant
would not be permitted to respond to that evidence with her own evidence of intoxication.
5 Id. at 2020-21 n.4 (plurality opinion).
6 Id. at 2026 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Now, consider the following hypotheticals:
1. A drunk person is driving a car, blacks out and runs over somebody. Under the substantive interpretation, this is murder; under the
evidentiary interpretation, it is not murder, although it is surely some
other crime.
2. A drunk person is in a bar with a gun in his waist band. He trips
and falls; the gun goes off killing somebody. Under the substantive
interpretation, this is murder; under the evidentiary interpretation, it
is not.

3. A person is in a bar, drunk as a skunk. He pulls out a gun and
jokingly points it at someone else. The gun goes off, killing the other
person. The perpetrator in fact did not intend the act, and has no
idea if he pulled the trigger. He certainly did not mean to. Under
the substantive interpretation, this is murder; under the evidentiary
interpretation, it is not. But, here note that the defendant might be
convicted under either interpretation. Looking at these facts, but
without knowledge of intoxication, a fact finder could easily conclude
that the defendant willed his action and intended the consequence.
Only through consideration of defendant's drunkenness would a different result most likely obtain, yet that is precisely what the evidentiary interpretation disallows.
Both Scalia and Ginsburg gave a different interpretation to the
statute from either of the ones I have advanced, although one that is
very hard to comprehend:
To obtain a conviction, the prosecution must prove only that (1) the
defendant caused the death of another with actual knowledge or purpose, or (2) that the defendant killed "under circumstances that would
otherwise establish knowledge
or purpose 'but for' [the defendant's]
7
voluntary intoxication."

This formulation requires the resolution of a very strange counter factual. It requires the fact finder to ask whether the mental elements
"would have been" established had the defendant not been intoxicated, even though he was and even though he in fact may not have
committed a voluntary act with the intent to bring out the forbidden
consequence. What might that mean? Consider the reasoning of a
fact finder faced with hypothetical #3 who is now told to analyze the
counter factual world in which the defendant was not intoxicated.
But, there isn'tjust one counter factual world of this type; there is an
infinite number of them. Thinking backwards in a causal universe,
one might very well conclude that the reason the defendant was not
drunk is because, for any number of reasons, he did not go drinking.
7 Id. at 2024 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Scalia seems to accept this interpretation. Id.
at 2020 n.4 (plurality opinion).
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And if he did not go drinking, he would not have been in the bar (or
at least such a counter factual world could exist if any could); were he
not in the bar, he would not have been in a position to pull out the
gun that accidentally went off. Maybe he was skiing in Colorado.
Maybe he was sunbathing in Florida. And so on.
To this it might be responded that the fact finder is supposed to
limit its consideration to a certain subset of all possible counter factual
worlds, perhaps those that place the defendant in the bar at the time
in question. One might reasonably ask why that is so, but never mind,
for this does not much change the problem. Suppose the fact finder
is now thinking about those counter factual worlds that place the defendant in the bar. But were the defendant not drunk, he certainly
would never do anything so stupid as carry a gun (o.k., limit your
counter factuals further-the defendant has a gun) or pull it out and
point it at somebody. After all, if you hypothesize that one thing is
different-the defendant did not drink-you ought to ask what may
be causally related to that now changed fact and adjust things
accordingly
If at this point the fact finder again is told to assume that the gun
was pulled out and pointed, there is no point to engaging in counter
factual analysis except as a smoke screen for imposing strict liability
on the defendant for the consequences of his acts while intoxicated.
If all a fact finder may consider is that an assumedly sober but actually
drunk individual pulled out a gun, pointed it, and pulled the trigger,
the conclusion of murder is inescapable. But if that is the point, why
distinguish the defendant who pulls out a gun, as in hypothetical #3
and the defendant who does not, as in hypothetical #2? Even though
the fact finder may mistakenly believe to the contrary, there is no
moral distinction between the two. They both were drunk, carried
firearms, and accidentally killed somebody. It is merely fortuitous
that in one case excluding evidence would lead to an inference of
intentionality and in the other case it would not.
We thus see another reason why Ginsburg's assertion that the test
is whether "the defendant killed under circumstances that would
otherwise establish knowledge or purpose 'but for' [the defendant's]
voluntary intoxication" is unconvincing. This assertion is equivalent
to saying that a case in which "the defendant killed under circumstances that would otherwise establish knowledge or purpose 'but for'
[the defendant's] voluntary intoxication" but in which the probability
that the defendant did act with knowledge or purpose is 0.0 is somehow different from one in which it is not true that "the defendant
killed under circumstances that would otherwise establish knowledge
or purpose 'but for' [the defendant's] voluntary intoxication" and the
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probability of knowledge or purpose is also 0.0. What difference
could the misleading surrounding circumstances make?8
And so the bottom line is that, taken at face value, Ginsburg and
Scalia's construction of the statute is strange ("consider a potentially
infinite number of counter factual worlds") and leads to a very
strained distinction between cases which possess no significant differences. Indeed, to avoid this strained distinction, the statute is better
read as imposing strict liability on intoxicated individuals.
Now suppose another counter factual world-one in which Scalia
and Ginsburg are reading this article. They would respond to my argument in the following fashion (I know this because it is my counter
factual world we are exploring): "It's all very interesting, but really
beside the point. You know full well what we were saying. We were
saying that the substantive change in the law is simply that the fact
finder is to put aside any evidence of intoxication when deciding
whether the mental states of mind necessary for murder were established." Well, perhaps so, but that means that the "substantive rule" is
really just a rule of evidence, which is precisely what the dissent argued and what Ginsburg, at least, was denying.
Or was she? Perhaps she, like Scalia, was saying that it does not
really matter whether you call this a rule of evidence or not. What
matters is the actual effect of whatever you call it on the defendant,
and the actual effect is obvious. The statute reduces the burden of
persuasion on the State to prove the mental elements. It shifts what I
called many years ago the relative burden of persuasion. However,
the statute may, in some cases, reduce the relative burden of persuasion on the mental elements to 0.0. Again, these two points are intimately interrelated. Consider first the concept of shifts in the relative
burden of persuasion:
Like the other evidentiary devices previously discussed, judicial comment merely alters the burden of persuasion. Compare two cases in
which the only distinguishing feature is that one does not contain judicial comment and the other does. To make the exercise more concrete,
assume the cases involve the charge of knowing possession of stolen
goods. In each case, the only evidence of knowledge is the fact of possession of recently stolen goods. Assume further that judicial experience
has yielded the insight that the possession of recently stolen goods is very
highly correlated with knowledge of the nature of the goods. And finally, assume that the judicial insight is not widely possessed by the general populace who make up juries.
In the first case, without judicial comment, the jury might conceiva8 A question also asked by Breyer and Stevens in dissent Id. at 2085 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Some people think we deserve our luck, which I suppose is one way to make
sense of Ginsburg's argument.
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bly convict, but certainly the chance of acquittal is higher than in the
second case, in which the judge explains the implications of possessing
recently stolen goods. The judge's comment increases the chance of
conviction by enhancing the effect of the state's evidence. In order for
the defendant to have the same chance of acquittal in the second case as
in the first, he would have to adduce more persuasive rebuttal evidence
than that advanced in the first case. Although the formal relationship
between the state and the defendant has remained the same - the jury
has applied the reasonable doubt standard in each case - the comment
has modified what may profitably be called the relative burdens of persuasion by altering the factual matrix within which the jury reached its
decision. The effect ofjudicial comment, then, is to shift the positions
of the parties by modifying the relative burden of persuasion that a deaffirmative defenses and placefendant bears on an issue, just as with
9
ment of the burden of production.
Substitute "exclusionary rule" or "substantive change in the law" for
"judicial comment" in the preceding two paragraphs, and the point is
obvious. By excluding relevant evidence on the "elements" of murder, the Montana statute does, just as the dissenters argue, lower the
relative burden of persuasion.
To which Scalia and Ginsburg essentially say, "So what?" If the
state can lower the burden of persuasion on factual issues directly,
why can't the state do it indirectly by what looks like a burden shift in
the guise of an evidentiary rule? But to make this argument, Scalia
and Ginsburg must go one step further. They must anticipate that the
relative burden of persuasion could be shifted to 0.0, that, in other
words, a person like Egelhoff could be convicted of murder even
though, taking into account the evidence of intoxication, no one
would believe that the mental elements otherwise required to establish murder are true. And after all, why not?, If the state can lower the
burden of persuasion on intent and a voluntary act to .5, convert them
into affirmative defenses, in other words, as Scalia and Ginsburg are
saying the state may do, why stop there? Why not .3 or .1 or 0.0? The
crucial and only question is whether the element must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. If the answer is no, then any burden of persuasion, including 0.0, is acceptable.
If what I have said is correct, then the bottom line, so far as we
have gone (but we do have further to go) is that Ginsburg and Scalia
are right. The Montana statute is odd in its definition of murder
(and every other crime analogously) as the traditional elements or
killing somebody while intoxicated (which is my view of what it does),
but what is unconstitutional about enacting odd statutes? Moreover,
9 Ronald J. Allen, StructuringjuryDedsionmaking in Criminal Cases: A Unified Constitutional Approach to Evidentiaty Devime_
omitted).

94 HARv. L. REV. 321, 331-32 (1980)

(citations
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suppose the state really meant to adopt something along the lines of
Ginsburg's view of the statute, as the Montana Supreme Court suggested that the Montana legislature did. That would simply mean that
Montana had enacted a really odd definition of murder, but what is
unconstitutional about really odd statutes?
Two things might be, one relatively trivial, the other more
profound but probably no longer viable. First the trivial. Statutes
must meet some minimal level of rationality to survive due process
analysis. Ironically, the harsher vision of the Montana statute (mine)
is almost certain to survive this analysis, while the less harsh version
(Ginsburg's) may not (but almost surely would). Under my view of
what this legislation does, the only question is whether it is "rational"
to punish somebody who kills while intoxicated. The question seems
to answer itself, and remember that no argument of "equal protection" has ever been used (to my knowledge) to strike down the
sentences provided for criminality. If the punishment for killing while
intoxicated is to be struck down, it will be stricken because of the
Eighth Amendment, which I discuss below, not because of a comparison to sentences provided for other crimes, including other definitions of murder.
Ginsburg view of the statute has greater problems, I think. It requires what for the most part is a nonsensical distinction between situations in which the mental elements are not true, but in one a counter
factual analysis could more easily (whatever this might mean) conclude that the mental elements existed whereas in the other no such
counter factual analysis could easily be done. Again, I think this
makes no sense for lots of reasons, including that a counter factual
world could always be constructed in which a person, appearing not to
intend what he did, did in fact so intend, but put this aside. Ginsburg's argument distinguishes between two people who did not intend to kill but did, and makes one a murderer and exonerates the
other, at least of murder. Even here, though, enough of an argument
could be made to get by rational basis scrutiny. Fewer errors exonerating intentional murderers will be made by allowing this distinction.
In a few of the cases in which "the defendant killed under circumstances that would otherwise establish knowledge or purpose 'but for'
[the defendant's] voluntary intoxication," the defendant may actually
have intended the consequences, even though a rational fact finder
looking at the evidence would conclude that he was too drunk to have
formulated an intent. The probability of this occurring in cases where
the evidence contains nothing to suggest an intentional actor, such as
hypothetical #2 above, is probably considerably less, thus justifying a
distinction between the situations.
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What, then, are the salient issues in the case? I think Scalia and
Ginsburg are correct that the proper question to ask is the constitutionality of the substantive statute, or one that could have been created to effect the same outcome as the evidentiary rule that actually
was created. The dissenters are not persuasive because their arguments would reduce to drafting advice, although prior to Egeihoff this
argument, unpersuasive as it is, was the only coherent justification of
the various Supreme Court edicts on burdens of proof. In any event,
even if the Montana legislature wrote a rule of evidence, striking it
down on that ground, even though a revised substantive statute effecting the same result would be permissible, merely advises the Montana
legislature on how to go about its drafting. Supreme Court justices
have better things to do than give drafting advice. While the distinction between a "rule of evidence" and a "substantive change" is often
an understandable one, in the present context the only significance is
form, not substance. If the substance of a statute survives analysis,
what constitutional right is adversely affected by its form? None that I
can see.' 0
There is more to say about the substance of this statute, though.
Scalia and Ginsburg both asserted that the Montana prosecutors had
to produce some evidence of the defendant's mental state." However, at least Ginsburg understood the basic thrust of the analysis
above, that a conviction for murder could be obtained even though a
rational person looking at all the available (but some not admissible)
evidence would conclude that the probability of an intentional act is
0.0. This is why she said that "in a prosecution for deliberate homicide, the State need not prove that the defendant 'purposely or know2
ingly cause[d] the death of another,' in a purely subjective sense."'
There is no other "subjective sense" than a "purely" subjective sense
applicable to actual states of mind, which means that Ginsburg is acknowledging that actual states of mind need not be proven under the
3
Montana statute. Whether Scalia understood this or not is unclear,'
10 See, e.g., RonaldJ. Allen, The Restoration of In re Winship: A Comment on Burdens of
Persuasion in Criminal Cases after Patterson v. New York, 76 MICH. L. REV. 30 (1977). Of
course, perhaps the problem is my eyesight. See, e.g., Barbara D. Underwood, The Thumb on
the Scales ofJustice: Burdens of Persuasion in CriminalCases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299 (1977). Also,
the defendant is better off with the dissent's interpretation than that of the plurality. A
rule of evidence is always more lenient than a rule of strict liability in this context.
11 Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2022-23 (plurality opinion); Id. at 2024 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
12 Id. at 2024 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting MoNT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-102(a)
(1995)).
13 Scalia's defense of the statute included references to historical materials that do recognize the point, however. The "exemplar of the common-law rule," according to Scalia,
is: "[I]f a person that is drunk kills another, this shall be Felony, and he shall be hanged
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but unmistakably this is an implication of the statute.' 4 Therefore, the
statute should be analyzed on that basis.
The proper question to ask, in short, is whether a redefinition of
murder that eliminates intentionality and voluntariness in cases involving intoxication is constitutional. That the actual statute may be
interpreted to limit the redefinition to situations where there is some
evidence of these mental elements (and thus to subdivide the set of
individuals who kill accidentally while intoxicated) is irrelevant for
precisely the reason given by Ginsburg and Scalia for ignoring the
evidentiary interpretation of the statute advanced by the dissenters: It
is the substance of the matter which should control. Even if the Montana statute demands some evidence of the mental elements (which
on its face I do not believe it does), that evidence could be completely
unpersuasive considered in context. Thus, the constitutional analysis
should turn on whether the mental elements of murder may be eliminated in the presence of proof of intoxication.
Well, can they? I guess so, since that is what Egelhoff stands for, a
point concurred in by some of the dissenters.' 5 Nonetheless, I think
the result shockingly, although understandably, wrong. The decision
is shockingly wrong because it essentially eliminates the Eighth
Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause as a constraint on
the proportionality of punishment. More precisely, it continues the
Court's progression of reducing the proportionality component of the
Eighth Amendment to virtual nonsignificance, and erects nothing in
its place.
The real question in Egelhoff is precisely the same question at the
center of the debate over presumptions and affirmative defenses that
began some twenty years ago. That question is whether there are constitutional constraints on the redefinition of traditional substantive
criminal offenses.' 6 Presumptions and affirmative defenses have precisely the same effect as the Montana statute. They change the requisite burden of persuasion or eliminate elements entirely, just as in
for it, and yet he did it through Ignorance, for when he was drunk he had no Understanding
nor Memory; but inasmuch as that Ignorance was occasioned by his own Act and Folly,
and he might have avoided it, he shall not be privileged thereby." Id. at 2018 (plurality
opinion) (quoting Reniger v. Fogossa, 75 Eng. Rep. 1, 31 (KB. 1550)).
14 O'Connor saw the point "[The State's] interest is to ensure that even a defendant
who lacked the required mental-state element-and is therefore not guilty-is nevertheless
convicted of the offense." Id. at 2028 (O'Conner, J., dissenting).
15 See id. at 2032 (Souter, J., dissenting). O'Connor was more ambiguous. See id. at
2031 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Breyer and Stevens withheld judgment. Id. at 2035.
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
16 There are other kinds of constitutional constraints. I put them aside.
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Egelhoff Following Mullaney v. Wilbur,'7 which struck down Maine's
common law defense of provocation, it appeared not only as though
the answer to the question whether there are constitutional limits on
the definition of criminality was yes, but also that no affirmative defenses were allowable.' This was too much for the Court, rightly so,
and in Pattersonv. New York' 9 it upheld a functionally identical statute
articulated in the vocabulary of the Model Penal Code, signaling that

20
it had erred in Mullaney.
The PattersonCourt did not seem to be signaling that it had erred
in Winship, the progenitor of the line, however. Indeed, at one point,
it seemed to signal that it was adopting the most promising of the
lines of analysis developed to explain the constitutional interest in the
reasonable doubt standard, which is that the state must prove beyond
reasonable doubt every fact necessary to ensure that the sentence is
not disproportional to the crime. 2 ' This interpretation of Patterson
recognized that Mullaney was overruled, but that Winship remained viable. Martin v. Ohio2 2 casts doubt on the viability of Winship by upholding the affirmative defense of self-defense. If a person acting in
self-defense can be convicted of murder, rather obviously very little is
left of the proportionality argument.
Following Martin, only one issue seemed to be open: could a
state eliminate intentionality from its definition of murder? Egelhoff
quite clearly answers that question in the affirmative, at least in the
presence of intoxication. I suspect that really does leave only one unanswered question: Can an accidental death in the presence of no
culpable behavior be punished as murder? One hopes the answer to
that question is no, but it is difficult to see an answer leading to that
result that would also not lead to the conclusion that Martin and Egelhoff are wrongly decided or have other, remarkable, consequences.
Consider, for example, the implications of resting the decision on the
actual argument that Scalia and Ginsburg relied on, which depends
on the production of some evidence of the mental elements. If it satisfies constitutional demands that "some evidence" of the necessary
elements is adduced at trial, then Winship, which required that every
fact necessary to establish criminality must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, has been overruled, and states may impose virtually any

17 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
18 See RonaldJ. Allen, Mullaney v. Wilbur, the Supreme Court, and the Substantive Criminal
Law--An Examination of the Limits of Legitimate Intervention, 55 T.x. L. REV. 269 (1977).
19 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
20 See Allen, supra note 9.
21 Patterson,432 U.S. at 209 n.11.
22 480 U.S. 228 (1987).
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burden of persuasion on the elements of criminal offenses.
Winship may very well have been eliminated as an independent
constitutional doctrine. In rejecting the state supreme court's argument about the shift in the relative burden of persuasion, Scalia asserted, apparently with Ginsburg's concurrence (for a total of 5):
What the court evidently meant is that, by excluding a significant line of
evidence that might refute mens rea, the statute made it easier for the
State to meet the requirement of proving mens rea beyond a reasonable
doubt-reduced the burden in the sense of making the burden easier to
bear. But any evidentiary rule can have that effect. "Reducing" the
State's burden in this manner is not unconstitutional, unless the rule of
evidence itself violates a fundamental principle of fairness (which, as discussed, this one does not). We have "reject[ed] the view that anything
in the Due Process Clause bars States from making changes in their
criminal law that have 23
the effect of making it easier for the prosecution
to obtain convictions."
This passage at face value asserts that, generally speaking, nothing
stops a state from shifting the relative burden of persuasion; if that is
true, it is hard to see what stops a state from shifting the explicit burdens. After all, substance, not form, should control.
As the plurality cast doubt on the continuing viability of Winship,
it also as a corollary cast doubt on the meaning of Chambers v. Mississii.

24

Most observers would have concurred with the Montana

Supreme Court's reading of Chambers-thatit creates an independent
due process right to the admission of exculpatory evidence at trial.
Perhaps most would not agree that "all" relevant evidence has to be
admitted, but most of it does; and the more important the evidence,
the greater its centrality to the case, the weightier is the argument for
admissibility. Not so, said Scalia. All Chambers dealt with was the implications of a few erroneous evidentiary rulings:
Thus, the holding of Chambers-if one can be discerned from such a factintensive case-is certainly not that a defendant is denied "a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations" whenever "critical evidence" favorable to him is excluded, but rather that erroneous
evidentiary
rulings can, in combination, rise to the level of a due process
25
violation.
But, the rulings in Chamberswere not erroneous under state law, and
nothing in Chambers asserts they were. The only "error" in Chambers
was that state law disadvantaged the defendant by making it more difficult to present a defense, which was held to violate due process (and
is precisely the claim made by Egelhoff). Scalia's construction of
23 Ege/koff, 116 S. Ct. at 2023 (plurality opinion) (quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania,
477 U.S. 79, 89 n.5 (1986)).
24 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
25 Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. at 2022 (plurality opinion).
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Chambers is thus a repudiation of what it actually held, and converts it
from articulating the free-standing principle of a defendant's right to
present a defense into an exercise in policy review, and a curious one
at that. Scalia has to be claiming that the evidentiary rulings were
erroneous as a matter of federal law, since the Court has no power to
review state law, but that makes no sense. In the context of Chambers,
no federal issue is implicated by the state's construction of its own
evidence rules, except the right to present a defense, which is undoubtedly why that right was the only one discussed by the Chambers
court. The obvious implication is that the case is a dead letter. No
general ground exists for reexamining state evidentiary policy, and if
that is what Chambers did, it obviously was a mistake. Furthermore, if a
defendant can be disadvantaged by an evidence rule concerning intoxication, why not by hearsay and voucher rules? Indeed, as the
Chambers opinion demonstrates, many states had rules quite similar to
Mississippi's. Employing the Egeihoff test of whether a state rule violates deeply rooted principles again generates the conclusion that
Chambers was wrongly decided if, as the plurality in Egeihoffapparently
asserts, the right to present a defense given the state's definition of
elements is not a free-standing, deeply rooted principle.2 6
Perhaps Egelhoffwill come to rest on the second of the plausible
arguments made about the limits of the State's power to define criminality in this context, which is that the common law form of criminality must be respected.2 7 If that is the case, again I think the decision
erroneous. The common law required proof of mental elements beyond reasonable doubt, notjust the adducing of some implausible evi28
dence of them, and permitted alcohol to negate "specific intent."
Scalia and Ginsburg's arguments respect the form of the common law
form of criminality, but not its substance. And again, as they responded to the dissenters in Egelhoff, it is the substance of things that
26 And if evidence rules merely define substantive liability, then again Chambers is a
dead letter. Evidence rules could not impede the right to present a defense; rather, they
would identify the substantive contours of liability.
27 Allen, supra note 9, at 342-48; John C. Jefffies, Jr. & Paul B. Stephan I, Defenses,
Presumptions, and Burden of Proofin CriminalLaw, 88 YALL.EJ. 1325 (1979).
28 The relevant common law did, in any event, which in my view is the law of this
century. Citations to the common law of England of centuries past strike me as peculiarly
unhelpful. If you go back far enough, you can find just about anything you like, ranging
from no common law of crime to strict liability to highly particularized mental elements.
What Scalia and others who use this argument neglect is that the "common law" is (was)
constantly evolving, and thus they tend to make the mistake of pointing at a certain period
as definitive or as beginning the definitive period without any explanation as to why that
point in time is significant. More to the point, the views of the elite classes of earlier
centuries bear no obvious relationship to contemporary problems. The idea that a modem, complex, urban culture like ours is explainable or should somehow be constrained or
even influenced by the views of Coke, Hale and Blackstone borders on the ridiculous.
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matters, not their form.
Following Egeihoff, then, individuals can be punished as murderers who are not proved beyond reasonable doubt to have committed a
voluntary act with the intent to bring about the prohibited result, a
result that can be reached either through the formal redefinition of
crime or through the exclusion of evidence on particular elements.
That is why it is shocking. It permits the most serious punishment we
impose, apart from capital punishment, for an act whose culpability is
measured by the wrongdoing implicit in drinking rather than the intentional killing of another human being. It is nonetheless understandable for two reasons. The first has to do with the difficulties and
implications of encouraging the growth of a robust proportionality
analysis; the second has to do with the consistent failure of the
Supreme Court to follow through on its criminal law initiatives. I discuss these points in turn.
In retrospect, I think it clear that one explanation for the reversal
of the Court's direction from Mullaney to Pattersonis its recognition
that substantive limitations on the definition of criminality tied to the
idea of proportional punishment could create a horrible morass for
the federal courts. The difficulties of tying proportionality review to
burdens of persuasion have been adequately discussed in the literature29 and need not be repeated here. It is sufficient to note that
every fact relevant to degree of criminality or punishment could be
swept up within the scope of a proportionality review. That could in
turn generate a highly intrusive review of state criminal processes by
the federal courts, and essentially shift sentencing authority from the
state courts to the federal courts. Part of that review would entail sufficiency of the evidence review to determine that necessary facts were
proven, in the federal court's mind, beyond reasonable doubt. Thus,
not only could proportionality review bring state sentencing practices
under the review and regulation of the federal courts; it could also
bring the entire evidentiary process along for the ride. To a Court
obviously trying to disentangle the federal courts from other kinds of
intensive reviews of state law (death penalty, habeas corpus, abortion,
reluctance to review even outrageous punitive damages awards), the
prospect of substituting intensive reviews of state sentencing practices
and sufficiency of the evidence would not be attractive.
The second reason that the Court's otherwise curious progression from Winship through Mullaney and Pattersonto Martin and Egelhofft 0 is not all that curious is that it mirrors virtually every other foray
29 See, e.g., Allen, supra note 17; Allen, supranote 9; Underwood, supra note 9.
-o Actually, the plurality would even undercut what little there is of Martin. See Egelloff,
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of the Court into the constitutional aspects of the substantive criminal
law, all of which are typified by early cases that seem to have lurking in
them grand pronouncements that would curtail state control over the
criminal law. In each case, those grand pronouncements were ground
down to virtual insignificance in subsequent cases. The reversal from
Mullaney to Patterson in just two years is one striking example. The
checkered history of Morissette v. United States 1 that apparently converted a potentially grand constitutional pronouncement into a rule
of statutory interpretation is another.8 2 I think the progression from
Thompson v. City of LouisvilleS8 to Jackson v. Virginia,34 is similar. Thompson can be seen as laying the groundwork for generalized sufficiency
of the evidence review. Jackson embraces the suggestion but immediately reduces it to practical insignificance: "the relevant question is
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."8 5 If, in the language of Thompson, there is any evidence of guilt, it will almost always
meet the Jacksonstandard. Robinson v. Califomia8 6 had the potential to
introduce a constitutionally required therapeutic regime to the substantive criminal law. Six years later, Powel v. Texas37 put an end to
such speculation. 88
These two points-the difficulty of a proportionality analysis and
the failure of the Court's constitutional criminal law initiatives to mature-are closely related. The second is just a generalization of the
first. All of these initiatives are similar to the burden of proof cases in
their capacity to transfer seriously difficult and politicized issues from
the states' legal and political processes to the forum of constitutional
review in federal court. Quite sensibly, the Supreme Court does not
want to mandate such large scale transfers of authority, especially not
in such traditional state domains as the substantive criminal law.
The difficulty, if there is one, is that the failure to extend federal
authority through constitutional decisions leaves no tools to deal with
aberrational statutes like Montana's.3 9 But perhaps there is nothing
116 S. Ct. at 2023 (plurality opinion).
31 342 U.S. 246 (1952).

& GuYoRA Bm-DER, CRIMINAL LAw.
199-221 (3d ed. 1996).
88 362 U.S. 199 (1960).
34 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
85 Id. at 319.
86 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
37 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
88 See SANFORD H. KADiSH & STrEvENJ. ScHUmHO .R,CRIMINAL LW AND ITS
CASES AND MATERIALS 1011-37 (3d ed. 1995).
89 Although it is not all that aberrational. Id.
82 &eJoHN KAPLAN, ROBERT WEISBERG
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to deal with. Perhaps the scope of the substantive criminal law and
punishment are simply matters to be negotiated by the population
and the legislature. That appeals to my basic instincts about appropriate governmental structures, but violates my sense that explicit provisions of legitimate law should not be simply ignored. Leaving the
scope of punishment solely to state legislatures makes the Eighth
Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause largely a dead letter, save only for its implications in capital cases. 40 Maybe it should be
a dead letter, the historical conditions giving rise to it largely having
abated. My own preference is to maintain a rough proportionality requirement, perhaps one analogous to the rough sufficiency of the evidence review generated by Jackson, although one can reach this
conclusion only after traversing a difficult road littered with such obstacles as original intent, the implications of changing social conditions for constitutional analysis, and the meaning of Fourteenth
Amendment due process of law. The path down this road is so highly
idiosyncratic that perhaps nothing useful can be said of it, and this
point alone may stand as a ringing vindication of what the Court did
in Egelhoff
So, from start to finish, Egelhoff is an astonishing case. No matter
how the statute is construed, it permits convictions for murder even
though mental elements are not functionally, even though maybe formally, proved beyond reasonable doubt. It thus at a minimum continues the reduction of In re Winship to practical insignificance. The case
solidifies the Supreme Court's indifference to the relationship between culpability and punishment, continuing also the reduction of
the proportionality component of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause to practical insignificance. And perhaps most astonishingly of
all, in passing it casts considerable doubt on the meaning, indeed the
very existence, of a defendant's right to present a defense. Of course,
like the good ambiguous picture that it is, all these perceptions melt
away if the statute is viewed as presenting the question of a state's
power over the criminal law. If that power is plenary, which may be
the message of Egelhoff none of these implications are "astonishing" at
all.
Many, but by no means all, of the astonishing perceptions also
40 The proportionality concept is largely a dead lead anyway, under contemporary
Supreme Court opinions. The Court has upheld egregiously punitive sanctions: Runmel v.
Estele, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (life sentence under a recidivist statute for three crimes of
fraud that netted less than $230.00); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (40 year sentence
for possession and distribution of approximately 9 ounces of marijuana). The Court did
strike down a life sentence for uttering a "no-account" check for less than $100 in Solem v.
Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
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melt away if the case is viewed as simply about intoxication, for which
there is some support tucked away in footnotes. 4 1 Those same footnotes also suggest another perspective that also reduces to some extent the astonishment. In one Scalia asserts: "So long as the category
of excluded evidence is selected on a basis that has good and traditional policy support, it ought to be valid";42 in the other: "[T]he
historical disallowance of intoxication evidence sheds light upon what
our society has understood by a 'fair opportunity to put forward a defense." 43 If these passages simply mean that historical practice is relevant to constitutional adjudication, they are banal, of course. If they
mean that the historical social disapproval of intoxication is relevant
to the constitutionality of the Montana statute, then again banality is
obvious. If they mean that the historical social disapproval of intoxication allows an intoxicated person who kills accidentally to be branded
and sentenced as a murderer, astonishment begins to creep back in.
And if they mean that the views of Coke, Hale, and Blackstone on
peneological policy are of substantial significance in adjudicating the
constitutionality of state penal statutes, full blown astonishment returns. These are the same gentlemen who believed, among many
other quaint beliefs, that an age of majority (and thus criminal responsibility) ranging upward from age seven years old is acceptable,
whose beliefs gave rise and sustenance to the bloody code of England,
with its more than 200 capital offenses and under which individuals as
young as ten were executed for stealing necessities. 44 Perhaps these
passages mean only that our historical practices, and those of England, provide interesting data to be viewed through the lens of contemporary problems. So viewed, forbidding leniency because of
intoxication is certainly acceptable, but equally clear should be that
punishing an accidental killing as murder because the defendant was
drunk is not.
I have one last point, which if valid rather ironically resuscitates
the dissent in Egelhoff It is based on another ambiguous picture
slightly different from the one so far considered. So far my argument
has rested on the point that if a rule of evidence can be reduced to a
substantive criminal provision, then the constitutionality of the statute
should be determined by the appropriateness of the substantive provision. If Scalia and Ginsburg are right, and on this point it looks to me
like they are, every evidentiary rule can be reduced to a substantive
Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S.Ct. 2013, 2017 n.1, 2021 n.6 (1996).
Id. at 2017 n.1.
4.1Id. at 2021 n.6.
44 See Sara Sun Beale & Paul H. Haagen, Revenge for the Condemned, 94 MICH. L REV.
1622 (1996).
41

42

RONALD . ALLEN

652

[Vol. 87

provision. Suppose a state decided to exclude hearsay evidence on
lack of intentionality-the argument that this can be construed as a
"substantive" change to the law is precisely identical to that used in
Egelhoff "Hearsay evidence" is simply substituted for "evidence of intoxication." Suppose further that all such statutes are acceptable"
redefinitions of crimes, a la Egelhoff Legislatures may then preempt
the essential distinguishing trait of courts, which I think is the individualized consideration of rights and obligations based on free evaluation of the evidence. A few words on this, and I will close.
In our jurisprudence, the legislative power extends to the creation of rules of general applicability, the judicial to the decision in
particular cases. If a legislature can specify the implications of particular pieces of evidence, this pragmatic distinction between legislatures
and courts is considerably reduced, perhaps even eliminated. An old
Supreme Court case makes the point very well. United States v. Klein45
now is mostly remembered as holding that Congress cannot by statute
affect the scope of the Presidential pardon power. This is a misreading of the case. The Court makes the point, but as an afterthought.
Its primary argument focuses on something else:
But the language of the [legislative] proviso shows plainly that it does
not intend to withhold appellate jurisdiction except as a means to an
end. Its great and controlling purpose is to deny to pardons granted by
the President the effect which this court had adjudged them to have.
The proviso declares that pardons shall not be considered by this court
on appeal. We had already decided that it was our duty to consider
them and give them effect, in cases like the present, as equivalent to
proof of loyalty .... The proviso further declares that every pardon

granted to any suitor in the Court of Claims and reciting that the person
pardoned has been guilty of any act of rebellion or disloyalty, shall, if
accepted in writing without disclaimer of the fact recited, be taken as
conclusive evidence in that court and on appeal, of the act recited; and
on proof of pardon or acceptance, summarily made on motion or otherwise, the jurisdiction of the court shall cease and the suit shall be forthwith dismissed....
The court is required to ascertain the existence of certain facts and
thereupon to declare that its jurisdiction on appeal has ceased, by dismissing the bill. What is this but to prescribe a rule for the decision of a
cause in a particular way? In the case before us, the Court of Claims has
rendered judgment for the claimant and an appeal has been taken to
this court. We are directed to dismiss the appeal, if we find that the
judgment must be affirmed, because of a pardon granted to the intestate
of the claimants. Can we do so without allowing one party to the controversy to decide it in its own favor? Can we do so without allowing that the
legislature may prescribe rules of decision to the Judicial Department of
the government in cases pending before it?
45

80 U.S. 128 (1872).
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the court is forbidden to give the effect to evidence which, in its own

judgment, such evidence should have, and is directed io give it an effect

precisely contrary.
We must think that Congress has inadvertently passed the limit which
separates the legislative from the judicial power. 46
So, we end where we began, with another ambiguous picture. According to the Klein court, prescribing the effect of evidence violates
the judicial power, indeed tramples on the crucial distinction between
the legislative and juridical powers. There is much to be said for the
Klein view, although one thing that cannot be said is that modem
courts have paid much attention to its lessons. Today, it is simply accepted that legislatures may prescribe rules of evidence for the courts.
The Federal Rules of Evidence are a legislative creature, for example.
The Court has even approved the legislative prescribing of the effect
of particular kinds of evidence. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.47
dealt with, among many other things, a federal statute forbidding the
denial of black lung benefits solely of the basis of an x-ray. Without
any apparent recognition of the depth of the problem, the Court
found this acceptable, commenting that of course Congress has plenary authority over rules of evidence.
But if congressional authority over evidence is plenary, what does
separate the legislative function from the judicial? This is the deepest
question posed by Egelhoff, and it raises a related one. Everyone
seemed to agree that the Montana courts had construed its statute to
not eliminate the requirement of purpose and knowledge, even when
a person was intoxicated. The Montana courts accepted, in other
words, the dissenters' views. Even if all the previous arguments are
accurate that the evidentiary interpretation of the statute collapses
into the substantive one, still according to the Montana court, the legislature had not eliminated these elements. They merely prescribed
rules of evidence that have the effect of generating conclusions that
the elements are true, even though the courts exercising their own
judgment on the evidence as a whole would have come to a different
conclusion. But that is tantamount-nay, it is precisely-instructing
the courts to give a certain effect to evidence, one different from that
which the courts would give. If the statute is taken as construed by the
highest court of the state, the normal principle of review of state statutes, then the question in Egeihoff is not whether the legislature can
define the elements of criminality; rather, it is whether it can prescribe the effect of evidence and by doing so undermine or restrict the
essential judicial function of particularized decision based on free
46 Id. at 145-47.
47 428 U.S. 1 (1976).
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evaluation of the evidence.
Klein said it could not; Usery said it can. Frankly, I don't see how
Usery can be maintained and a robust distinction between courts and
legislatures maintained at the same time. The modern age has neglected a profound problem, I think, with its too casual acknowledgment of plenary legislative authority over rules of evidence. Or is Klein
just wrong, unsuited for modem times? I think it best to leave that
question for the commentators, whose views follow immediately.
E-MAIL DEBATE AMONG COMMENTATORS
FROM: JOSHUA DRESSLER

I can think of no one better qualified to dissect Montana v. Egelhoff than Ron Allen, one of our nation's foremost scholars of evidence
and criminal procedure, and the author of some of the most important articles on the law of presumptions.
I use the word "dissect" purposely because, I am afraid, Allen is
studying the corpse of In re Winship. Short of a High Court-induced
Resurrection, Winship is dead. Oh, it will remain technically true that
criminal defendants are presumed innocent, and that the Government must prove guilt of a "crime" beyond a reasonable doubt, but
the Court has sent the message-not once, but at least three times
(Pattersonv. New York, Martin v. Ohio, and now Egelhofl)-that this presumption is a technicality that need not long delay any legislature with
contempt for the first principle of our criminal justice system.
Allen's analysis of Egelhoff and the current state of presumption
law is persuasive and, as is always the case with his work, thoughtful,
moderate (even understated), and rational. I would not presume (no
pun intended) to take exception here with anything he has written
about the case. (I leave that to others. Good luck.) Instead, I would
like to focus on another important observation by Allen, one that I
think deserves attention. Unlike with Ron's piece, my brief comments
here will be immoderate (translation: a bit overstated). The temptations of Internet are too strong, alas.
Egelhoff is a sign of something bigger than even the death of Winship. It is a symptom-another symptom-of the fact that the
Supreme Court is a victim of IGPS (Inchoate Grand Pronouncement
Syndrome). Allen makes the point more diplomatically than I. He
says that Egelhoff
mirrors virtually every other foray of the Court into the constitutional
aspects of the substantive criminal law, all of which are typified by early
cases that seem to have lurking in them grand pronouncements that
would curtail state control over the criminal law. In each case, those
grand pronouncements were ground down to virtual insignificance in
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subsequent cases.
One example of IGPS, cited by Allen, is the Court's treatment of
strict liability. In Morissette v. United States, the Justices seemed on the
verge of saying that a person may not be convicted of a crime in the
absence of proof of moral guilt by the actor. But, the Court marched
up the mens rea hill only to back down and leave the matters in legislative hands. Herbert Packer would mock the Justices by saying that,
based on the case law, "mens rea is an important requirement, but is
not a constitutional requirement, except sometimes." See Packer,
Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. Ct. Rev. 107, 107.
I prefer to focus here on three other lines of cases. First, there is
Robinson v. Calfornia. In Robinson, the Court seemed oh-so-close to
incorporating into the Constitution ajust deserts principle: the Eighth
Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment bars a
State from using its criminal laws to punish a person for conduct that
is the result of a condition beyond his or her control. Now, maybe
this would have been too broad a principle (as I have tried to suggest
in some of my excuse writings, I think it is), but it was a Grand Pronouncement in the making. The Court soon backed away (even in an
opinion by Justice Marshall). After Powell v. Texas, all that was left of
Robinson was the principle that a State may not punish a person for a
status; a person may only be punished for conduct (but not necessarily
even "voluntary" conduct). In today's world even Powell is a nice statement, one that I am not at all sure the current Court would make, but
it moved the Justices far away from the GP of Robinson.
Then, we have Coker v. Georgia, where Justice White announced
for the Court that the Eighth Amendment prevented Georgia from
executing a recidivist rapist/murder and life termer for rape, for the
simple reason that, on the present occasion, the convicted man did
not take a life. In essence-the lurking GP-was this: the Eighth
Amendment bar on grossly disproportional punishment incorporates
the retributive principle of just deserts (or, more accurately, the idea
that even if the general justifying aim of the criminal law is utilitarian
in nature, a matter for legislative determination, a state must honor
certain retributive limits on utilitarianism, one of which is that punishment must not be retributively grossly disproportional). But, this GP
died on the vine (if I may mix my metaphors), when the Court, 5-4,
stood aside and allowed Texas to impose a life sentence on a minor
league thief who had taken a third strike (Rummel v. Estelle). After a
brief hiccup (Solem v. Helm), the Court effectively buried the proportionality principle (and Cokeis GP reading of it) in non-capital cases
in Harmelin v. Michigan.
And, now, we have the Winship line. Mullaney v. Wilbur seemed to
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warn States that the Court was going to take the presumption of innocence seriously. The high court came close to saying that the State
would have to carry the burden of proof, beyond a reasonable doubt,
of disproving any defense or mitigating circumstance (or, at least, any
one with an historical pedigree). Thus, it was taking seriously the
idea that culpability (among other factors of a crime) mattered. Patterson implicitly overruled Mullaney, and showed us that a legislature
could avoid the strictures of Winship by creative statutory drafting.
Egelhoff shows that a State can do the same by inartful drafting. We
are left with precious little of Winship except White's bland assurance
in Patterson that "'it is not within the province of a legislature to declare an individual guilty or presumptively guilty of a crime'" and that
it "cannot 'validly command that the finding of an indictment, or
mere proof of the identity of the accused, should create a presumption of the existence of all the facts essential to guilt."' (Of course,
after Egelhoff, there need not be many facts essential to guilt.)
What do these Great Pronouncements That Never Were have in
common? In each of these lines of cases the Court seemed on the
verge of realizing and saying something important, namely, that the
criminal law is very different from civil law-so fundamentally so that
it justifies constitutional recognition. Henry Hart made the point
about the criminal law decades ago when he said that a criminal offense "is not simply anything which a legislature chooses to call a
'crime.' It is not simply antisocial conduct which public officers are
given a responsibility to suppress. It is not simply any conduct to
which a legislature chooses to attach a 'criminal' penalty. It is conduct
which, if duly shown to have taken place, will incur a formal and solemn pronouncement of the moral condemnation of the community."
[Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Probs 401
(1958).]
In a world run by Lady Wootton [see "The Function of the
Courts: Penal or Preventive?" in her book, Crime and Criminal Law]
or Karl Menninger, Hart's observation might seem nonsensical. [Menninger wrote in his classic book, The Crime of Punishment (1968)
that "the very word justice' irritates scientists. No surgeon expects to
be asked if an operation for cancer is just or not."] To them, the
purpose of the criminal and civil law is to work together to repress
crime and treat criminals. In their view, there is little justification for
drawing a firm line in the sand between civil and criminal commitment. But, in a society that believes that it is wrong to condemn people who are morally innocent or, to condemn persons more than they
deserve, Winship had something profound to say-a genuinely Grand
Pronouncement. Although the Court, even then afraid of GPs, tried
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to couch the presumption of innocence on consequentialist grounds,
the real point of Winship was deontological: "the fundamental value
determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent
man than to let a guilty man go free." (Harlan, J., concurring in Winship.) This value is based on the idea that there is something specialdifferent-about a criminal conviction-the community condemnatory feature Hart had in mind.
Hart has complained that "[i]f one were to judge from the notions apparently underlying judicial opinions, and the overt language
of some of them, the solution of the puzzle [of what distinguishes
criminal wrongs from civil wrongs] is simply that a crime is anything
which is called a crime .... So vacant a concept is a betrayal of intellectual bankruptcy."
How right he was. The Supreme Court, in particular, has provided us with a set of labels, most notably the labels "crime" and "criminal justice system" that are shells. They are bodies without a soul, at
least, none that is visible in a constitutional realm. (We are apt to see
that again when the Court hands down its opinion on sexual predator
laws.) Now, in part, I concede that I sympathize with those who say
that the Court is right not to be seduced into making Great Constitutional Pronouncements. After all, who are they to say to legislatures
that they must recognize just desert principles in their laws? Isn't that
classically a matter for public debate and democratic resolution? But,
we are talking here about some very basic principles of justice that,
according to JusticeJackson are (were?) "as universal and persistent in
mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a
consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil." [Morissette v. United States].
That was a Grand Pronouncement, but one that the Court does
not seem likely to repeat in the realm of criminal law anytime soon.
Egelhoff shows us that the a majority of the Justices have a very
cramped vision of their role as Justices. A Court that is prepared to
say that a person may be punished for murder if he kills while voluntarily intoxicated (regardless of his genuine state of mind); or a Court
that upholds a statute that requires a state to prove mens rea, but then
allows the state to prevent the defendant from introducing relevant
evidence that might raise a reasonable doubt regarding mens rea
[these are among the possible readings of Egelhoff] is a Court that
really does not believe that there is anything special about the criminal law (or, at least, anything special enough to deserve protection).
Soon, there may not be.
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FROM: CHARLE-s NESSON

I've just read Ron's fine comment on Egelhoff A significant part
of his analysis turns on his assertion that the Ginsburg approach
would permit "a conviction for murder.., even though a rational
person looking at all the available (but some not admissible) evidence
would conclude that the probability of an intentional act is 0.0." That
takes Ron to what he considers "the proper question to ask,"-i.e.,
"whether a redefinition of murder that eliminates intentionality and
voluntariness in cases involving intoxication is constitutional." In the
note appended below (written before seeing Ron's piece, but which,
in number of ways, joins it nicely), I question whether Ginsburg (and
Montana) would interpret the statute as Ron suggests. This, in turn,
leads to a different view of the proper question to ask.
Hurrah for Ginsburg! She's the only one who got it right, full of
good sense, and joined by nobody!
The case that first got me thinking about this issue is People v.
Register,from New York. A guy comes into a bar carrying a gun, gets
roaring drunk, gets into a fight and shoots another guy in the stomach, killing him. He's prosecuted under New York law for murder in
the second degree. The New York court instructs the jury that it
should not consider his intoxication in determining whether he acted
with "depraved indifference" (the key phrase defining second degree
murder in New York). The crime, says the New York court, is to be
judged by objective standards.
Breyer says, that doesn't make any sense: Judging by objective
standards would mean that intentionally sideswiping a car would look
like negligence, and negligently running down a pedestrian in a crosswalk would look like intentional murder. Breyer is right, but only if he
takes the "objective" language literally and to an extreme to which it
need not be taken. He is assuming that evidence of inebriation would
not be permitted to distinguish intentional crime from accident. In
the bar room case, the defendant intended to pull the trigger and to
hit his victim with the bullet. Had he claimed the shooting was an
accident ("I passed out, and as I was falling I knocked over a table with
a gun on it, and as it hit the floor it discharged, hitting the victim in
the stomach"), there is no reason to think a court would have excluded the evidence of inebriation. Likewise, nothing in the Montana
case says that Montana would ignore the classic line between intentional crime and accident. Montana, New York, and the other states
that exclude evidence of intoxication do so on the issue of diminished
capacity, not on the issue of accident or no capacity at all. In fact,
Montana allowed Egelhoff to put on proof of his drunkenness in an
effort (unsuccessful) to show that he was physically incapable of doing
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the killings and therefore it must have been someone else. If Egelhoff
claimed that he got drunk and fell down, unintentionally discharging
a gun that just happened to shoot a bullet into each of the heads of
his victims, we have no reason to think that Montana would bar his
evidence. But, having shot two people in the head, he could not colorably claim accident. The issue of exclusion in the case is completely
confined within the category of intentional crime, with the effect of
the rule being to exclude evidence of intoxication only when offered
to mitigate the degree of intent.
So, just because the Montana Supreme Court fell into the conventional mistake of talking about the exclusion of intoxication on the
issue of murderous intent as an issue of evidence, the Supreme Court
of the United States feels it has to follow suit, and in the process either
screw up some very important constitutional evidence law (as the
Scalia plurality opinion screws up Chambers) or rule that the exclusion
of intoxication is unconstitutional (as the dissenters do), notwithstanding the eminent good sense of a rule that denies the voluntary
drunk intentional killer a diminished capacity defense.
It is a shame that the plurality opinion goes off on its evidentiary
analysis. Scalia is right, of course, when he observes that relevant evidence can be excluded even if offered by a defendant in a criminal
trial. We are familiar with that idea when relevance is marginal and
potential for confusion great. Rape shield laws, hearsay rules, privilege
rules-all offer examples. But even in those categories I had thought a
rule of reason would apply, calibrated to how probative the excluded
evidence is, and how deeply its exclusion compromises a fair prospect
of defense. That's what Chambers stood for. And now, according to
Scalia, Chambers stands for nothing. He even misstates it, saying it was
a case in which erroneous evidence rulings were so serious as to violate due process, whereas the doctrinal challenge of Chamberswas that
the evidence rulings were not erroneous. Mississippi's voucher and
hearsay rules were not state of the art, but neither were they unconstitutional. It's just that, in combination, their application thwarted
Chambers from putting on evidence of his innocence that seemed
pretty damn powerful to the Supreme Court. The principle of the
case was not that a defendant has a right to put on all relevant evidence, but rather that a state can't completely thwart a defendant
from putting on credible proof that someone else did the crime.
Chamberswas interesting and important because the Court said, "even
when states use lawful rules, there is still a constitutional interest in
seeing that the rules produce justice."
In a footnote (note 4) Scalia acknowledges the power of Ginsburg's approach, and tries to equate his own to it, saying it makes no
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difference whether a state accomplishes its result by redefining a
crime or by establishing an evidence rule that makes it impossible to
prove some element or defense to the crime. With this asserted equation, Scalia seems to say that his opinion must, therefore, make as
much sense as Ginsburg's. This footnote, though, obscures two
problems. First, if there is a valid equation, then Scalia need not have
trashed Chambers. Since all agree that Montana could redefine the
crime of murder to exclude any element of sobriety, it would follow
that Montana could do the job with an evidence rule. Chambers, on
this approach, is totally inapposite, and, therefore, need not have
been distinguished (into oblivion). Second, the equation itself is
highly vulnerable. Who says that a state can fiddle around with the
definitions of crime indirectly through evidence rules? There is great
value in maintaining the integrity of the process of proof, not allowing
it to be undercut by irrebuttable presumptions and other forms of
Catch-22 provisions that simultaneously offer defenses and then foreclose all means of proving them. The dissenters (including Breyer)
were clearly inspired by the idea that "due process" embodies a principle that law should not speak with a forked tongue. Evidence rules
should be rational. The process of proof should have integrity, regardless of what is being proved. Substantive changes in the elements
of crimes should be made by changes in the substantive law, not by
manipulating the rules of proof in ways that undercut their rationality.
Scalia's footnote bypasses this idea (and the whole dissenting position) without explanation, or even recognition.
My question, on this second "forked tongue" principle, is whether
the Montana rule implicates it. It's not like Montana said: "Burglary is
breaking and entering in the night. We now establish an evidence
rule that a defendant can't prove it was day." This would be a real
Catch-22. The Montana intoxication rule is quite different. The "intent" element of murder is much more obscure, and therefore an evidence rule as a means of clarifying it seems much less arbitrary. The
Montana murder law specifies killing which is "purposeful or knowledgeable." One could easily understand this aggregation of mental
states to mean "not accidental." "Purpose" plus "or knowledge" = intentional = not accident. That's perfectly plausible. It is not apparent
that "sobriety" or "clear-headedness" is an element of intentionality.
Given this obscurity, Montana's choice to proceed by an evidence rule
hardly seems an example of speaking with forked tongue. Ginsburg
makes a pretty good point in noticing that the Montana rule is not
even included in its evidence section, but rather is included in the
sections that define the crimes.
The dissent can point to the fact that the Montana Supreme
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Court said that evidence of intoxication was "obviously" relevant to the
intent element of murder, which would seem to imply an interpretation of the Montana murder statute to include a requirement of clearheadedness. But even so, doesn't the good sense of Ginsburg's approach warrant at least a remand to Montana to see if they want to
stick with their unnecessarily narrow reading of the intoxication statute as merely an evidence rule?
The bottom line, unfortunately, is a plurality opinion that unnecessarily trashes constitutional commitment to rationality in rules of
proof,judged both by their procedural integrity and their substantive
outcome, and even worse, trashes the basic principle of justice that
Chambers bravely stood for.

FROM:

DONALD

R.

STUART

Egelhoff appears to confirm that there is no constitutional principle in the Unites States under the due process clause or the Eighth
Amendment against a legislature removing any meaningful fault requirement from a crime as serious as murder or preventing the trier
of fact from considering evidence of intoxication relevant to a determination of intent. There also appears to be no constitutional violation of the presumption of innocence where the legislature removes
the element of fault or creates an affirmative defence with the persuasive burden of proof on the accused. Please correct this crazy Canadian if I am wrong!
Ron Allen vacillates in his reaction. At several points he finds the
result "shocking" but at pages 648 and 650 he states that "the idea of
proportional punishment could create a horrible morass for the federal courts" and "Perhaps the scope of the substantive criminal law
and punishment are simply matters to be negotiated by the population and the legislature." Joshua Dressler also writes of the need for
"Grand Pronouncements" but concedes at that he sympathizes with
"those who say that the Court is right not to be seduced into making
Great Constitutional Pronouncements."
Why the hesitation? In law and order times politicians cannot be
relied upon to assert basic principles ofjustice to protect the accused.
There are no votes in being soft on crime. It may be undemocratic but
I find it laudable that the Supreme Court of Canada, interpreting a
Charter of Rights only entrenched in 1982, has asserted the following
constitutional standards:
(1) fault is required for penal responsibility whenever there is a threat

to liberty;
(2) the act must have been voluntary,
(3) punishment must be proportionate and in particular intentional
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acts must be punished more than negligent conduct; and
(4) any persuasive burden of proof on the accused violates the presumption of innocence. (Under the Canadian Charter the State may
persuade a Court that a violation is demonstrably justified.)
If the United States Supreme Court is so hands off do criminal
law scholars have a responsibility to speak out at every opportunity?
It seems odd that the Egelhoff due process analysis turns so much
on the state of U.K. law in the 19th century and earlier. Sir James
Stephen (the author of the 1892 Canadian Criminal Code) said the
following about Blackstone: "Blackstone was neither a profound nor
an accurate thinker, and he carried respect for the system which he
administered and described to a length that blinded him to its defects,
and lead him in many instances to write in a tone of courtly, overstrained praise which seems absurd to our generation."
What of the 70-plus year 20th century history of the (unfortunate) House of Lords compromise that voluntary intoxication is a defence to so-called "specific" intent crimes or the approach of the
Australian High Court to allow intoxication to be considered in any
determination of intent?
In the particular context of murder, why didn't the Supreme
Court consider the murder/manslaughter distinction entrenched as it
is in so many Anglo-American jurisdictions? Justice Scalia relies heavily on the view that excluding drunkenness as a defence to murder will
deter. If so, there should be evidence that jurisdictions with Montana
style laws are safer. No such evidence is provided.
In Montana, when a drunk person kills, you must now consider
the accused sober and ask whether he or she intended to kill.
"Counter factual" devices surely do the law little credit. This is not to
say that drunken killers never intend to kill. The circumstantial evidence in Egelhoff certainly points to a double assassination. But the
possibility of murder conviction in any of the three hypotheticals provided by Ronald Allen strikes me as the exercise of blunderbuss State
power. Mostjurisdictions have fixed penalties for murder and flexible
sentences for manslaughter. Doesn't a consideration of all the evidence to discover whether intent has been proved beyond reasonable
doubt properly define those to be punished as murderers?
D. GRANO
I don't think that Klein, discussed at the end of Ron's article, is as
broad as he makes it out to be, but I may have difficulty articulating
the point.
After the Civil War, Congress passed a statute permitting the
Treasury Department to sell abandoned or captured property. Any
FROM: JOSEPH
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person, however, who had never aided the enemy (i.e., the South)
could claim the proceeds from such sale. What about those who had
received presidential pardons? The courts had ruled that they were
entitled to the proceeds from the sales.
Klein, who had a pardon, sued in the Court of Claims and won a
judgment on May 26, 1869. The government filed an appeal on December 11. On April 30, 1870, the Supreme Court in another case
affirmed a similar Court of Claims decision. Congress responded with
a statute that not only made proof of pardon inadmissible in the
Court of Claims but required the Supreme Court on appeal, in cases
that turned on pardon, to dismiss the cause of action for want ofjurisdiction. If the statute applied in Klein's case, its direction to the
Court to dismiss the cause of action for want ofjurisdiction was tantamount to ordering a reversal.
It was in this context that the Court said that the act was invalid
for prescribing the rule for decision in a certain way. Nothing in Klein
suggests that Congress can't prescribe the rules of evidence for federal
courts.
Klein must also be read in conjunction with Ex Parte McCardle
which preceded it by only three years. In McCardle, the Supreme
Court upheld the very controversial statute revoking appellate jurisdiction to hear appeals in habeas cases, like the one brought by McCardle (who essentially was challenging Reconstruction). Afraid, with
some basis, that the Court was going to rule in McCardle's favor, Congress repealed the appellatejurisdiction it had only recently given the
Court while McCardle's case awaited decision.
The Court was eager to limit McCardle. It got the chance in Kein.
The Court said the act in Kein wasn't a real jurisdictional statute.
Rather, it said the statute denied jurisdiction as a means to an end:
denying pardons the effect the Court had said they had. The Court,
under the statute, had jurisdiction until it determined that a certain
fact (i.e. a pardon) existed. This, accordingly, was not a true exercise
of the Congressional power to carve out exceptions to the Court's appellate jurisdiction.
It would be truly amazing if Kein, or any other case, stood for the
proposition that Congress lacks the power to prescribe the rules of
evidence for federal courts. First, the implied power to prescribe rules
of procedure and evidence stems from the fact that Congress doesn't
have to create the lower federal courts at all. Second, the necessary
and*proper clause gives Congress authority to pass all laws that are

necessary and proper for carrying into execution all powers vested by
the constitution in the United States or "in any Department or Officer
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thereof." This includes the judiciary.
Finally, I don't know what it means to say, as Ron does in introducing Mlein:
In our jurisprudence, the legislative power extends to the creation
of rules of general applicability, thejudicial to the decision in particular
cases. If the legislature can specify the implications of particular pieces
of evidence, the pragmatic distinction between legislatures and courts is
considerably reduced, perhaps even eliminated.
FROM: DIANE

AMANN

Can a legislature, Professor Allen asks, "prescribe the effect of evidence and by doing so undermine or restrict the essential judicial
function of particularized decision based on free evaluation of the evidence"? In Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013 (1996), at least five
Justices agree that if the Montana intoxication statute had constrained
jurors to convict absent full and particularized proof of each element
of the offense, the Due Process Clause would have been violated. Id.
at 2024 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); id. at 2026-31 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 2032-34 (Souter, J., dissenting). Yet no violation was
found because, in Justice Ginsburg's view, the statute simply "redefined" the offense, and did not constrain jurors. Id. at 2024-26. But
from the view of James Egelhoff-with which I became familiar in
writing, for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the
lone amicus brief on his behalf-undue constraint ofjurors' decisionmaking is exactly what occurred.
Egelhoff had been found, prone and semiconscious, in the flattened back seat of a station wagon that had careened off a highway.
Montana v. Egelhoff 900 P.2d 260, 262 (Mont. 1995). In the front seat
were a dead man and woman, a bullet through the head of each. Not
only was Egelhoff "yelling obscenities" at the scene, 116 S. Ct. at 2016,
he also was asking ambulance attendants, "Did you find him?" 900
P.2d at 263. There had been two guns in the car; only one was found.
The State charged Egelhoff with two counts of deliberate homicide, in
violation of MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-102 (1991), which permits imprisonment or execution of a defendant whom the State proves "purposely or knowingly cause[d] the death of another human being."
This statute attributes no significance to a defendant's intoxication.
At trial, the State relied heavily on intoxication evidence.
Through direct testimony of a State witness, jurors learned that Egelhoff's BAC, or blood-alcohol concentration, had been .36 percent.
(For some, this constitutes a lethal dose of alcohol. See DIAGNOSTIC &
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 203 (4th ed. 1994)). The
State's evidence suggested that Egelhoff was violently drunk, though
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still able to shoot the victims. 900 P.2d at 262-65. In response to the
State's use of intoxication evidence, Egelhoff elicited expert testimony
that with a .36 BAC, he likely was incapable of committing the homicides, and may have been suffering an alcoholic blackout at the time
they occurred. The State then asked that MoNT. CODE. ANN. § 45-2203 (1991), be given as an instruction to jurors, as follows:
A person who is in an intoxicated condition is criminally responsible for his conduct and an intoxicated condition is not a defense to any
offense and may not be taken into consideration in determining the
existence of a mental state which is an element of the offense unless the
Defendant proves that he did not know that it was an intoxicating substance when he consumed the substance causing the condition.
900 P.2d at 263. The trial court acceded, and Egelhoff was convicted.
This sequence of events reveals the contention that § 45-2-203
created a new offense to be a fallacy. Egelhoff was not charged with
the offense of killing while intoxicated; rather, the charge of which he
was given due notice was deliberate homicide, punishable only on
proof that a defendant killed while possessing the requisite state of
mind. Intoxication became an issue at trial, when the State adduced
evidence in an effort to show that Egelhoff was drunk and violent yet
capable of killing. Section 45-2-203 then emerged as a jury instruction, separate from the statement of elements of the offense. Jurors
were permitted to consider intoxication evidence in support of all aspects of the State's theory. They were not free to evaluate intoxication
evidence freely, however, for the instruction forbade them to consider
any defense evidence undercutting the State's theory. Rather, in its
instructional guise, Section 45-2-203 operated to compel jurors to convict absent sufficient particularized proof of mens rea. (Indeed, given
that the State's theory related both to mental state and to physical
capability, conviction may have resulted absent sufficient proof of actus reus as well).
Justice Ginsburg's contradictory view of the case both mystifies
and disturbs. It mystifies because of its divination that the legislature
has rewritten its homicide statute, using a method so subtle that even
Montana's highest court did not discern the "redefinition." See 116 S.
Ct. at 2033 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting 900 P.2d at 263-65). To
require a legislature to amend its statute by a more direct method is
notjust "drafting advice"; at some point it is a command of the Constitution's notice requirements.
Justice Ginsburg's view disturbs because of its acceptance of the
effect of "redefinition" in this case: late-in-the-day invocation of the
intoxication statute to strip Egelhoff not only of his defense, but also
of his most powerful evidence to challenge the State's offense. This
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latter concern may be idiosyncratic. It does not relate to the question
ostensibly presented; that is, whether a state may legislate against consideration of voluntary intoxication in determining mental state. See
id. at 2016. But "highly case-specific error correction" is not, as the
plurality in Eglhoffconcedes, beyond the purview of the Court. See id.
at 2022 (discussing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973)). Had
the Court not wished to engage in fact-specific adjudication, it should
have dismissed Egeihoffas improvidently granted and waited for a petition that properly framed the question, rather than issuing this "astonishing" decision.
FROM: RON ALLEN

Prof. Amann makes many good points. Let me stir one small corner of this pond:
Justice Ginsburg's contradictory view of the case both mystifies and
disturbs. It mystifies because of its divination that the legislature has
rewritten its homicide statute, using a method so subtle that even Montana's highest court did not discern the "redefinition." See 116 S. Ct. at
2033 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting 900 P.2d at 26-65). To require a
legislature to amend its statute by a more direct method is not just
"drafting advice"; at some point it is a command of the Constitution's
notice requirements.
Perhaps there should be a notice requirement that means lay individuals should be put on notice, but there isn't. The notice requirement is determined by whether a satisfactory legal construction can
be placed on the statute. If memory serves, Rose v. Lundy is the best
example (correct me if I have the wrong case). There a statue was
upheld over a vagueness challenge on the ground that the lower court
had once cited some other case that dealt with an analogous situation
to the present one. Or something to that effect.
I am not so sure this is a bad thing. Could we really expect there
to be true "notice" of the intricacies of the law of theft, for example?
FROM: RON ALLEN

Prof. Stuart writes:
Ron Allen vacillates in his reaction. At several points he finds the
result "shocking" but at pages 648 and 650 he states that "the idea of
proportional punishment could create a horrible morass for the federal
courts" and "Perhaps the scope of the substantive criminal law and punishment are simply matters to be negotiated by the population and the
legislature." Joshua Dressler also writes of the need for "Grand Pronouncements" but concedes at that he sympathizes with "those who say
that the Court is right not to be seduced into making Great Constitutional Pronouncements."
Why the hesitation? Because there are serious questions of legiti-
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mation. What one disapproves of may not easily map on to governmental arrangements. Moreover, suppose one took the position, as
the liberals did twenty years ago, that the Court should "do the right
thing." When the Court changes, and thus what it collectively thinks
the "ight thing" is changed, too, what ground does one have to object
to the Court doing its now revised view of what the "right thing" is?
Not a very good one, obviously, as the present predicament of constitutional liberals demonstrates quite dramatically. One is reduced to
complaining that the Court is not doing what "I"think is the right
thing, which is to most others not a very compelling argument.
FROM: RON ALLEN
Prof. Grano addresses one of most interesting, in my view, but
neglected questions concerning the judicial power. He says:
It would be truly amazing if K/ein, or any other case, stood for the
proposition that Congress lacks the power to prescribe the rules of evidence for federal courts. First, the implied power to prescribe rules of
procedure and evidence stems from the fact that Congress doesn't have
to create the lower federal courts at all. Second, the necessary and
proper clause gives Congress authority to pass all laws that are necessary
and proper for carrying into execution all powers vested by the constitution in the United States or "in any Department or Officer thereof."
This includes the judiciary.
Do you think that Congress could set up the lower courts and
then pass a constitutional statute that says the courts must consult with
their local congressmen before deciding any cases? I, actually, am a
fan of greater includes the lesser arguments, but they have their limits.
Finally, I don't know what it means to say, as Ron does in introducing Keimn
In our jurisprudence, the legislative power extends to the creation
of rules of general applicability, the judicial to the decision in particular cases. If the legislature can specify the implications of particular pieces of evidence, the pragmatic distinction between
legislatures and courts is considerably reduced, perhaps even
eliminated.
I am puzzled by this. Bills of Attainder are forbidden because
courts, not legislatures, should decide whether conditions of liability
are satisfied. If there are no constraints on the creation of rules of
evidence, bills of attainder can easily be created: "Whenever Ron Allen is a party to any case whatsoever, the fact finder shall infer that the
other side deserves to win." Ridiculous, of course, but I think it makes
the point.
Take a less ridiculous example: Usery. The point of the legislation
was to increase recoveries by coal miners, regardless whether they suf-
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fered from black lung disease. Why isn't that a bill of attainder in
substance if not in form? Now, I raise the bill of attainder point not to
convert the discussion into its nuances, but because it captures the
point, I think, about the essence of the judicial function. If there are
no limits on the legislative power to prescribe rules of evidence, the
legislature may preempt the judicial power over facts. If so, what is
left to the distinction between the two? And indeed, why couldn't
"rules of evidence" be written to prescribe the outcome of legal interpretation as well?
As to his historical argument, it perfectly reflects the case, and
maybe Klein is simply an historical anomaly. But the issue it raises
isn't, I don't think. Correct me if I am wrong.
FROM: MARIANNE WESSON

Some assorted reflections on Montana v. Egelkoff (from one who
could not stay out of the discussion despite her resolution just to lurk
from time to time while doing her "real" work).
Could we view the series of cases from Mullaney to Patterson to
Sandstrom to Martin to Egelhoffas asking the following question: When
may a state offer the prosecution some relief from the heavy burden
of proving every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt? We
would count as "relief' in this sense either of the following: the assignment of some burden of proof to the defendant obligating him to
refute the element (this can be accomplished through instructions,
either straightforwardly, as in Patterson, or more subtly, as in Sandstrom); or a prohibition against the defendant's employment of some
otherwise relevant evidence that tends to refute the element (as in
Egelhof/). Viewed in this light, I believe the cases suggest that the answer was once "history and tradition" (Mullaney), then became, apparently temporarily, a sort of formal linguistic analysis of the text of the
statute and of the instructions (Patterson,Sandstrom, Martin), and now
is once again history and tradition (plurality opinion in EgelhofJ).
Note that criminal defendants can win (Mullaney, Sandstrom) as well as
lose (Patterson,Martin, Egelhof/) under both touchstones.
Although I have quite enjoyed and agreed with much of the conversation about "Grand Constitutional Pronouncements," I am not
sure I think Egelhoff signals a retreat from the kind of jurisprudence
that would require a lofty judicial role. Indeed, I think one of the
attractions of the Patterson/Sandstrom formalistic period is that once
understood, the principle those cases suggested (well-characterized by
Ron Allen as "drafting advice") could be applied by almost anyone. It
required no wisdom, only a kind of bookkeeper's mentality. (Rather
like the Rule Against Perpetuities. I once heard a story about a Trusts
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and Estates teacher who tormented his students by bringing to class
his very small daughter, who had apparently mastered the Rule and
could unerringly produce the correct answer to any hypothetical requiring its application.)
I am not legal historian enough to quarrel with Justice Scalia's
account of the place of the intoxication doctrines in the common law
and how they interacted with the doctrine(s) of mens rea. His account
does not smell quite right to me, and I look forward to the day when
someone with more credentials than I might take it on. But it does
seem to me that a doctrine that requires for its application the kind of
nuanced, multi-sourced, and inherently disputable historical inquiry
he produces in his opinion is more likely to lead to a larger judicial
role in the adjudication of constitutional disputes over the substantive
law of crimes than to a smaller. This is perhaps not a drawback to the
method in the minds of some jurists. But it seems somewhat at odds
with what I had taken to be Justice Scalia's jurisprudential commitments, which it would doubtless be somewhat flippant to characterize
as "Le text, c'est tout" (although I think I will anyway).
I think I have a little more fondness than most for the now-discredited theory of this line of cases (that is, discredited by Egelhoffi,
that suggests they provided "drafting advice." The notion that a state
may define crimes any way the political pressures on legislators will
permit (subject to some very broad constitutional constraints like freedom of speech, press, association, and the right to privacy) has,
IMHO, a lot of appeal. I also like the proposition that once they define the crimes, no fooling around with burdens or presumptions or
rules of evidence designed to make the prosecutor's job easier is allowed. The respectable antecedents of this view (as Diane Amman
notes) are the vagueness doctrine and the American tradition against
common-law crimes. (Sure it was "formalistic," but have you read very
many death penalty cases lately? I recommend the experience if you
really want to see formalism run amok.) I liked Patterson and Sandstrom for their benign intentions, and their modest and comprehensible formal limitations.
So I like Justice Ginsburg's observation, also mentioned by
Charles Nesson, that a careful reading of the Montana laws defining
crimes would make clear to the reader that the requirement of "intention or knowledge" doesn't really apply to the intoxicated killer. It is,
she says, as though the statute informed "You commit murder in Montana if you kill with intention or knowledge, unless you're drunk, in
which case the intention or knowledge part doesn't matter (much)."
But in the end I can't agree with her that the whole setup gives sufficient notice, because of the vagueness of that (much). Apparently in
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Montana there is still a requirement that the prosecutor prove something about the defendant's mental state. Scalia says so, and so does
even Ginsburg. Diane Amman's useful account makes clear that the
prosecutor thought so too. It is just (as-was it David Kaye?-argues
with his convincing critique of the "counterfactual" aspect of Ginsburg's reading) that it's very unclear what that requirement is. I think
Ginsburg is inclined to give drafting advice, only perhaps more tolerant drafting advice than that given in Mullaney and Sandstrom. I like
that in ajustice (and you gotta like ajustice who cites The Secret Life of
Walter Mitty in a case that's not even about the law of attempt). But
finally, I couldn't understand her drafting advice.
Doesn't it seem that the "historical" approach of the plurality
here is presaged in Medina v. California(1992) and Cooperv. Oklahoma
(1996)? In Medina, the Court held that California could place the
burden of proving incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence
on a defendant whose competency might be doubted. But in Cooper,
the court unanimously recoiled from the assignment to the defendant
of a burden to prove incompetence by clear and convincing evidence.
Obviously the "formal" approach cannot justify this different treatment under that approach, if competency were an "element" of the
crime, no burden whatsoever could be placed on the defendant, and
if it were not, any burden whatsoever could be assigned to the defendant. But the historical approach can, and did, justify both outcomes:
the common law, history, and tradition, the majority argued in Medina,did or would have sanctioned the California approach. But (they
held in Cooper) never the greater Oklahoma burden.
Another interesting parallel is the Court's consideration of confrontation clause claims by convicted defendants, which has rested
heavily in recent years on whether the hearsay exception that authorized the prosecution's use of hearsay against the defendant was "firmly
rooted." (If it is, the confrontation clause challenge will almost certainly fail.) Scalia has questioned this approach in confrontation cases
(see the Thomas/Scalia concurrence in White v. I//inois (1992)), but
he grasps it with enthusiasm here, even down to his use of the phrase
"deeply rooted."
But perhaps the historical, "rootedness" approach will inure to
the benefit of defendants. Consider, for example, the post-Hinckley
Congressional enactments concerning the federal law of insanity. According to this statute, the burden of proving insanity rests on the
defendant, by clear and convincing evidence. Using the formal approach, one would think this enactment perfectly constitutional: since
insanity is an affirmative, rather than an element-negating, defense,
any burden whatsoever may be placed on the defendant. Now, after
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Cooper and Egelhoff, I'm not so sure.
FROM: SAMUEL PILLSBURY

I wanted to follow up on the comments of Joshua Dressier and
Ronald Stuart about Egelhoffas an example of problems in the United
States Supreme Court's approach to criminal culpability. I have some
thoughts about the case as an intoxication case, then pick up on
larger questions about the Supreme Court's reluctance to consider
criminal law issues on their culpability merits. As to the latter, I should
echo Josh's concern about going off topic-but on the premise that
detours and distractions often prove to be the most memorable parts
of trips, I include it as well.
Although Egelhoff may have broader implications, it is first and
foremost an intoxication case-and a confusing one for the same reasons that many intoxication cases are-because of some bad analytic
habits that legislatures and courts both employ. The assumption
made by the legislature, and many of the justices, that we can sensibly
treat intoxication as a unitary phenomenon in all cases is demonstrably wrong.

Ron Allen and Justice Breyer do an excellent job of pointing out
that intoxication may present vital evidence about the ordinary inter-

pretation of conduct, particularly whether harms are purposeful or
accidental. Intoxication might also be relevant to the proof of the
killer's identity-Egelhoff apparently made this argument. (See the
Montana Supreme Court opinion and Diane Amann's comment.)
But in the usual homicide case, intoxication actually bolsters the
prosecution's evidence of purposeful wrongdoing. Alcohol intoxication reduces inhibitions and makes persons far more likely to act on
anti-social impulses than if sober. The person who feels the desire to
slug someone for an obnoxious comment will restrain himself if sober
but may well act on the impulse if drunk enough. Did the person purposely strike the insulter? You bet. What role did intoxication have?
It lowered inhibitions, maybe it even exaggerated the original sense of
injury from the comment. Intoxication made it MORE likely that the
striking was purposeful, not less.
There is a separate issue about when clear-thinking, usually expressed as premeditation, is required. Montana seems to have eliminated premeditation as a murder element, a position that many
support on the ground that it does not supply a reliable measure of
culpability. This is consistent with the nineteenth century casesJustice
Scalia cites and quotes deriding the use of intoxication to negate the
deliberation/premeditation/cool thinking often associated with murder rather than manslaughter. Then there is the issue raised by Egel-
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hoff in his defense of unconsciousness-an alcoholic blackout which
might be a state like that of sleep-walking, where there is rational direction of the body but no consciousness. I will not address the factual underpinnings or moral merits of such an argument-it's enough
here to recognize that it's a rather different one than others based on
intoxication.
Finally, when the crime involves careless wrongdoing, intoxication may well negate the standard mens rea of recklessness, but on
culpability grounds this is usually a mistake-which explains the law's
general exclusion of intoxication argument here. If we focus, as many
courts, commentators and legislators do, on awareness of risk, then
intoxication will commonly negate that risk. (Here it's worth noting
with respect to the eighteenth century quotes used by justice Scaliathat lawyers of that day spoke of mens rea to refer to culpability generally, not necessarily the states of awareness that we predominantly use
today.) Drunks do not see risks that sober people do. Does this mean
that intoxication reduces culpability? Not necessarily. Awareness
USUALLY correlates well with culpability.
But intoxication demonstrates the insufficiency of awareness as a
true test of culpability. We blame the drunk driver for acting with
indifference to the welfare of others on the street without regard to
actual awareness of the danger. Awareness usually serves as a proxy
for indifference-it demonstrates the attitude of not caring enough to
look out for harms to others the person may do. Becoming intoxicated usually dulls awareness, but it may nevertheless serve as evidence
of indifference. To the extent that the killing in People v. Register discussed by Charles Nesson was really a nonpurposive killing, it illustrates the point that drunken resort to violence can prove culpable
indifference.
The main problem with Egelhoff in culpability terms is the failure
to grapple with these important distinctions. Revealingly, there is little discussion, in any of the opinions, of how intoxication might have
altered the culpability of Egelhoff. Is there any real possibility that the
two persons in the car, found shot in the head, were killed by accident? Or by someone other than Egelhoff? Do we really think that
the astonishingly intoxicated Egelhoff was a fundamentally different
person for responsibility purposes than the sober Egelhoff? We need
to discuss particular cases and their particular facts, as Ron Allen does
with his various examples in his provocative essay, and not be satisfied
with selective quotes and general observations about the dangers of
the intoxicated as Justice Scalia is.
But I want to return to the question Josh Dressler emphasizedwhy the Court in its constitutional analysis has so often approached
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culpability issues, and nearly as often shied away from them. The
Court seems terrified of giving the central concept in criminal law-

culpability-a constitutional dimension, despite language in the Due
Process Clause and Eighth Amendment that would seem to give ample room for such a move. Very briefly-and I hope provocatively-I

want to suggest a few reasons why I think the Court has made a bad
choice concerning its constitutional role here. Obviously I have left
off the countervailing, and significant concerns of federalism, constitutional restraint and the difficulties of culpability analysis itself.
Democratic Process. The criminally accused represent a small
minority of population whose interests are normally discredited by
elected officials. Why should we expect legislators to take great care or
exercise good judgment in devising criminal laws that they normally
expect will never apply to them or those they care about?
Time Roles-Court and Legislature. In criminal legislation particularly we have reason to fear the fads of public opinion-the crime
of the week, the criminal "solution" of the week approach of legislatures. By contrast, on culpability issues courts bring to the table a valued sense of history, of long-term concerns with regard to culpability
rather than simply short-term concerns with dangerousness.
Justice Writ Large and Small. Legislatures properly set general
policy about criminal justice, but by their nature such institutions have
a hard time imagining and focussing on the many individual nuances
involved. Only courts face the faces-see the individuals and deal with
their individual justice claims.
Discrimination and the Mask of Discretion. Most bad culpability
rules-rules that make culpability determinations at odds with our
best intuitions-will not become public controversies because their effects are often masked by the presumed judicious exercise of
prosecutorial discretion. We assume-and generally it is true-prosecutors would not seek a murder conviction in a case of truly accidental
homicide like the second example described by Ron Allen. But when
the defendant is a member of the politically powerless, when he has a
criminal record, when the Police for whatever reason think he's a real
dirt bag, prosecution for murder may well happen. Now discretion
does not save the system-but neither will there likely be a public outcry at an over-broad murder rule. Again courts are institutionally best
situated to address this problem.
Fear of Right and Wrong Talk Generally. Finally, the Court's reluctance to take up culpability as a serious concern mirrors a societal
disquiet-at least among its elite membership-to discuss issues of
right and wrong on their merits. We can talk about fair process until
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our voices expire, but become hesitant when the subject of right and
wrong comes up. The topic seems utterly subjective and dangerously
divisive. Interesting how our faith in the value of discussion evaporates in the face of the most serious moral questions.
FROM: JOSHUA DRESSLER

Perhaps there should be a notice requirement that means lay individuals should be put on notice, but there isn't. The notice requirement
is determined by whether a satisfactory legal construction can be placed
on the statute. If memory serves, Rose v. Lundy is the best example (correct me if I have the wrong case).
Close. Rose v. Locke.
There a statue was upheld over a vagueness challenge on the
ground that the lower court had once cited some other case that dealt
with an analogous situation to the present one. Or something to that
effect.
It was even worse than you suggest. The court had cited case law
from another state applying a similar (vague) statute: this was supposed to put D on notice to check out the law in the other state. Had
he done so, he would have found ANOTHER case (not the one cited)
that was on point.
FROM: JERRY NORTON

I find it difficult to disagree with Ron Allen's criticisms of Montana v. Egeihoff, or with the threats which he believes it might represent to a whole history of due process limits on substantive and
procedural criminal law. My initial reaction was that surely they don't
have to go that far! This led me to speculate on some limitations on
how far the decision might be projected. Aside from the obvious limitation-that there is no opinion for the court-I would suggest a
couple of others.
First, as Professor Allen has suggested, this case may really only be
about the intoxication defense. This defense has had a long history of
"curious," if not downright illogical, statutes and rules. Witness the
longstanding rule (Justice Scalia refers to it as the "new common law"
rule) that voluntary intoxication may be a defense, but only for "specific intent" crimes. In applying this rule, courts often swim around
among the varying meanings which "specific intent" may carry. Logically, intoxication shouldn't be a "defense" at all. The question
should be whether or not the accused had the mens rea for the crime,
and intoxication should simply be one factual consideration among
many which are weighed in deciding whether the subjective mental
state was present. However, few American jurisdictions have taken
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this approach. Even the American Law Institute, in its drafting of the
Model Penal Code, rejected this approach when it was advocated by
Judge Learned Hand. Rather, it proposed what only amounts to a
rewriting of the "specific intent" limitation to the intoxication defense. Perhaps the Supreme Court will come to view Egeihoff only as a
case concerning a "curious" Montana statute, but one which is no
worse than the curious statutes and rules found throughout the history of this hybrid defense.
My second point is that, even if the Court later assigns greater
significance to Egeihoff,I'm not sure that it would be required to abandon Chambers v. Mississippi. The language used by Justice Scalia, which
denigrates Chambers, seems to represent a view shared only by the
Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy and Thomas. Justice Ginsburg's
concurrence lends no support to it. She argues that the Montana
statute, in effect, defined murder as killing 1) while having a subjective mental state, or 2) while intoxicated (where a sober person would
probably have had a subjective mental state). Combined, the two parts
of this statute simply make the extent of intoxication irrelevant, she
argues. If intoxication is irrelevant under this statue, and if the statute
is otherwise constitutional, the exclusion of evidence of intoxication
would not be a due process violation under Chambers. The four dissenters did not disagree with this reasoning. Their disagreement was
with her conclusion that the two parts of the statute made intoxication
irrelevant. NeitherJustice O'Connor's opinion for the four dissenters
nor the separate dissent by Justice Breyer gives any comfort to Scalia
and his three colleagues. OnlyJustice Souter offers any possibility. In
part HI of his separate dissent he acknowledges that Scalia's argument
might have been made by Montana-but that it wasn't made. Souter's language appears to go no farther than to announce an open
mind on the issue of a newer and smaller Chambers v. Mississippi.
FROM: RON ALLEN

A number of you have made interesting points about the burden
of proof analysis. The weirdness of the world we now seem to inhabit
is for me well demonstrated by the somewhat obscure case of Carellav.
California,109 S.Ct. 2419 (1989), involving a conviction of grand theft
for failure to return a rented car. The jury was instructed on two statutory presumptions:
1. Intent to commit theft by fraud is presumed if one who has leased
...(blah blah blah) ... fails to return the personal property within 20
days [and so on];
2. Whenever a person who has leased or rented a vehicle ...willfully and intentionally fails to return the vehicle.., within five days
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after the lease... has expired, that person shall be presumed to have
embezzled the vehicle.
The court reversed the conviction, on "standard" (whatever that
might mean) burden of proof grounds. After Egelhoff, shouldn't it be
clear that these presumptions merely specify the conditions of liability? And if for some reason "presumption" language is not within Egelhoffs reach, all California has to do is change the presumption
language to "is guilty of" in the second case, and make analogous
changes in the first.
FROM: DOUG MILLER

Ron Allen wrote (first quoting Professor Amann):
To require a legislature to amend its statute by a more direct
method is not just "drafting advice"; at some point it is a command of
the Constitution's notice requirements.
Perhaps there should be a notice requirement that means lay individuals should be put on notice, but there isn't. The notice requirement
is determined by whether a satisfactory legal construction can be placed
on the statute. If memory serves, Rose v. Lundy is the best example (correct me if I have the wrong case). There a statue was upheld over a
vagueness challenge on the ground that the lower court had once cited
some other case that dealt with an analogous situation to the present
one. Or something to that effect.
I am not so sure this is a bad thing. Could we really expect there to
be true "notice" of the intricacies of the law of theft, for example?
The notice point is crucial for those of us with a formalist bent.
And the Court may well be addressing it this term. In United States v.
Lanier,the Sixth Circuit threw out several convictions obtained against
a state judge who had allegedly harassed employees as well as at least
one litigant. The convictions were under 18 U.S.C. § 242, the criminal
counterpart of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the charging documents specified "substantive" due process as the source of the underlying constitutional rights. Judge Lanier pointed out that the Supreme Court has
never explicitly recognized an absolute substantive due process right
to "bodily integrity," let alone a right to be free of harassment. Prosecutors argued that several recent cases in other circuits had recognized these rights; they relied in particular on a Fifth Circuit case
involving sex between a school coach and a student. The Sixth Circuit
held essentially that the rights being asserted were not sufficiently
clear at the time of Judge Lanier's conduct. (There was also some
question about whether all of Judge Lanier's conduct was "under
color of"some law, as required by section 242.) United States v. Lanier
will be argued in January or February 1997, I believe. If the Court
reinstatesJudge Lanier's convictions, I hope it leaves some remnant of
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the notice requirement intact.
FROM: DIANE AMANN

Perhaps the Supreme Court will come to view Egelhoff only as a
case concerning a "curious" Montana statute, but one which is no
worse than the curious statutes and rules found throughout the history of this hybrid defense.
Montana's statute may be "curious," but it is not unique. At the
time of briefing in Egehoff, respondent's conservative analysis revealed
that three states-Delaware, Hawaii, and Missouri-already had upheld similar rules against constitutional due process challenges. Six
others-Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, South Carolina, and
Texas-had approved preclusion of consideration of intoxication
without undertaking constitutional analysis.
FROM: ABNER GREENE

Does the Montana penal code, as construed in Egelhoff, speak
with a "forked tongue," to borrow Charles Nesson's phrase? Nesson
concludes that it does not, but I would like to challenge that
conclusion.
In short, my argument is that the combined instructions given to
the Egelhoffjury violate due process because there is a substantial likelihood that the jury was not clear as to why it was convicting Egelhoff
of murder.
We want juries to be clear as to the structure of blaming in the
criminal law. It would be constitutional, in my judgment, for a state to
say clearly to ajury "A defendant may be punished for murder for any
death resulting from his or her conduct while intoxicated, regardless
of the defendant's state of mind at the time of the conduct." Ron
Allen seems to disagree with this conclusion, but I wonder whether
Allen believes that the felony murder rule in its unmitigated form is
unconstitutional. Surely there are defendants convicted of murder
without proof of mens rea for the victim's death.
But the Egelhoffjury, and other Montana juries in similar situations, may well convict a drunken killer of murder-blaming such a
killer for the most heinous crime-based on a false version of the
facts. Montana law on deliberate homicide requires that the prosecution prove that the defendant either purposely or knowingly caused
the death of another human being. This requirement-as the Justices
acknowledged-is not eliminated in cases of drunk defendants. For a
jury to convict someone such as Egelhoff, it must conclude either that

the defendant's conscious object was to cause death or that he was
aware that there existed a high probability that his conduct would re-

678

RONALD J ALLEW

[Vol. 87

suit in death. The jury must believe, that is, that the defendant possessed a subjective state of mind that we blame most severely. That is
how Montana law is written-proof of purpose or knowledge for deliberate homicide; purpose and knowledge defined as subjective states
of mind.
The statutory provision foregrounded in Egelhoff-the one that
forbids consideration of voluntary intoxication in determining "the
existence of a mental state which is an element of the offense"-must
be seen as part of the package of statutory provisions in play. This
provision, combined with the definitions of deliberate homicide and
of purposely and knowingly, makes it substantially likely that ajury in
a case with death resulting from the conduct of a drunk defendant
will blame that defendant for deliberate homicide when the defendant did not commit deliberate homicide. Nesson is wrong to suggest
that Montana maintains the line between intentional crime and accident. There are plenty of cases in which ajury might infer subjective
intent to kill from objective facts-say, a car hitting a pedestrianwhere evidence of intoxication would reveal an accident.
Again, in my view, a state may punish as murder accidental killing
while intoxicated. If the statute states this clearly, then ajury can decide whether it wants to blame a drunk defendant who kills while intoxicated for murder, regardless of that defendant's mens rea. But
the Montana statute speaks with a forked tongue; it opens the real
possibility of a jury blaming a defendant for murder based on a false
understanding of what happened. Juries may conclude from objective
evidence that a defendant purposely or knowingly-as a subjective
matter-killed, even in cases in which this conclusion is clearly false.
It seems a core violation of due process to allow juries to blame defendants based on a false view of the facts. To allow a jury to say,
essentially, "Yes, we want to blame this defendant as one who committed deliberate homicide, and yes, we know this is the most serious type
of blaming a jury can do," should require a full consideration of
whether the defendant did, in fact, possess the statutory stipulated
subjective mens rea. If Montana wants to dispense with such proof, it
should do so in a way that makes clear to juries what they're doing
when they're branding someone as a murderer.
FROM: DOUG MILLER

Abner Greene writes that the Montana statute speaks with a
forked tongue, because it precludes consideration of intoxication,
thereby leaving jurors with a false view of the facts. But isn't this true
whenever evidence is excluded over the objection of a criminal defendant? I think Egelhoff is wrong, but I don't think this is the reason,
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exactly.
There has to be a way to deal with all these burden-shifting evidentiary devices and bizarre drafting choices in a uniform manner.
(Incidentally, shouldn't we also include practices such as judicial
"comment on the evidence," allowed in California, and "summing
up," the bane of many a British defense attorney? These also operate
as so many "thumbs on the scales ofJustice," to use a phrase popularized by (I think) Barbara Underwood.) To reopen a question raised
earlier: is there any chance of resurrecting the proportionality doctrine in our lifetimes?
FROM: ADAM THURSCHWELL

Message text written by Ron Allen (quoting Joseph Grano):
Prof. Grano addresses one of most interesting, in my view, but neglected
questions concerning the judicial power. He says:
It would be truly amazing if K/ein, or any other case, stood for the
proposition that Congress lacks the power to prescribe the rules of
evidence for federal courts. First, the implied power to prescribe
rules of procedure and evidence stems from the fact that Congress
doesn't have to create the lower federal courts at all. Second, the
necessary and proper clause gives Congress authority to pass all laws
that are necessary and proper for carrying into execution all powers
vested by the constitution in the United States or "in any Department or Officer thereof." This includes the judiciary.
Ron Allen responds that:
Bills of Attainder are forbidden because courts, not legislatures, should
decide whether conditions of liability are satisfied. If there are no constraints on the creation of rules of evidence, bills of attainder can easily
be created: "Whenever Ron Allen is a party to any case whatsoever, the
fact finder shall infer that the other side deserves to win." Ridiculous, of
course, but I think it makes the point.
It's not a major theme of Egeihoff or of Ron Allen's piece, but it's
worth noting that the Klin principle-that legislatures may not dictate rules for particular cases-is more than "simply an historical
anomaly" (Allen), at least to justice Breyer, who recently relied on this
notion in his concurrence in Plautv. SpendthriftFarm,Inc. (one of the
rare instances in which the Court has struck down a Congressional
statute on separation of powers grounds). Although I think it probably won't be reached, the Klein issue is also now pending before the
10th Circuit in the Oklahoma City bombing case-one of the government's and victims' arguments to allow victims both to view the trial
and testify at a capital sentencing hearing (on appeal from the trial
judge's exclusion of all victim-witnesses from earlier phases of the trial
under FRE 615) is that 42 U.S.C. § 10608 (the statute granting special
closed-circuit television access for victims in certain trials in which a
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change of venue occurs) overrides Rule 615. Sec. 10608 was plainly
passed solely to dictate a rule of decision to Judge Matsch (in fact,
that's what the victims argue). Thus, via the (alleged) conflict with
Rule 615, § 10608 arguably represents the type of legislative interference with a trial judge's ability to make evidentiary determinations
that Ron Allen deplores at the end of his comment.
Again, this is very much a side issue as to Egelhoff, but I thought
others might be interested in knowing that Klein isn't quite dead yet.
(Full disclosure-I'm working on the case, so that judgment may be
colored by partisan optimism).
FROM: MYRNA RAEDER

As an evidence professor, I had become quite used to formalism
in presumptions and burden shifting after Pattersonand Martin. I assumed a legislature could draft what it wanted so long as it was simply
redefining crimes-isn't that why nobody ever seriously questioned
the validity of felony murder (even the California Court at its most
defense oriented stage upheld felony murder against claims that it imposed a conclusive presumption of malice and resulted in improper
burden shifting). So what if Martinrendered self-defense meaningless
as an affirmative defense because the same evidence was still relevant
to raising a reasonable doubt. Reversal was only required when the
legislature got it wrong, made an improper evidentiary presumption
that was not a substantive law change, or the judge gave an instruction
based on judicially promulgated evidentiary rules that operated to
burden shift and/or interfere with the presumption of innocence.
(An aside: does presumption of innocence have separate meaning for
constitutional analysis or is it only an explanation of how burden shifting works?). The only other constitutional bar was an abstract proposition that you could not violate a traditional principle of justice,
which had some meaning at the extremes-such as when our sensibilities are offended because a defendant must demonstrate incompetency by clear and convincing evidence. Although, I never have
understood why competency isn't treated as an element that cannot
be shifted to the defense, I assumed that as a matter of history, the
Court viewed it as part of the underlying framework in which the elements of a specific crime are defined.
Not teaching criminal law, I hadn't focused on intoxication, but
was simply waiting to see if some judge would instruct that alibi was an
affirmative defense to be proved by the defendant, triggering what I
hoped would be a real discussion of the limits of burden shifting,
rather than a Martin-like approach that so long as the jury understood
the same evidence could raise a reasonable doubt, no harm, no foul.
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However, this never occurred because the case-law was pretty uniform
that proof of alibi was negation of crime, not an affirmative defense.
Thus, I naively read Egeihoffwithout a clue that Chamberswas in danger
of becoming extinct.
Unlike some, I have no problem with the proposition that it
shouldn't matter if a legislature considers a presumption as evidentiary or substantive, so long as it really redefines the crime (although,
I agree that if the State court hasn't considered it a redefinition, this
should be given deference, because even if a state can redefine the law
as indicated, if it didn't do so we have an advisory opinion by the
Supreme Court). Carellaalways struck me as odd, because I agree with
Ron that the presumption really reworked the elements of the offense-was it overruled sub silentio in Egelhoff/ However, I think Ron's
example that evidentiary revisions can now legitimize a law which in
essence says Ron is always guilty (no matter how warranted) would
offend due process, because it is aimed at a specific individual, which
is not the way we historically have defined crimes. (All kidding aside, I
have always admired Ron's incisive analysis which is admirably displayed in his Egeihoffessay, and am grateful to him for providing all of
us with the opportunity to sort out our thoughts about Egeihof]).
The closer issue for me is under the present mode of constitutional analysis whether it is ok to say that all felons, child molesters,
etc. are prohibited from presenting exculpatory evidence, such as lack
of mens rea. While the legislature can broadly define crimes to encompass behavior by such categories of people, I get extremely queasy
because we don't seem to be able to predict dangerousness, and isn't
some of this status rather than conduct oriented, or edging into First
Amendment freedoms if the suspect category is at heart, political (indeed I am awaiting the Hendricksdecision as to commitment of sexual
predators with some trepidation). Post-Egelhoff,I expect the focus will
remain on whether the crime has truly been redefined. Thus, if a particular substantive statute has different evidentiary provisions aimed at
different categories of people, it probably survives a due process challenge, unless Carellaretains any life. In contrast, I think it still prohibited to have a substantive crime, and an evidentiary code provision
that treats a particular category of people differently in all cases (regardless of whether the evidentiary provision is legislatively or judicially created).
In other words, even in the post-Egeihoffera, I have difficulty believing that a general provision in the evidence rules could constitutionally change the nature of every crime committed by someone in a
disfavored category. I say this full knowing that evidence rules are not
transsubstantive, particularly Rule 404(b) (prior bad acts), and 609
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(convictions used for impeachment). But rules that disfavor criminal
defendants generally have policy rationales that dictate admission, not
exclusion of relevant evidence, and usually are not aimed at a specific
category of defendant. I also recognize that 413-415 were aimed at
sex offenders, but again the rule favors admission and has a host of
other potential constitutional infirmities based on poor drafting and
the admission of bad character as propensity if not otherwise relevant.
The closest to an evidentiary rule of exclusion aimed at a specific
category is the rape shield, but the Supreme Court has held that to
the extent evidence of bias is critical in determining the victim's credibility, its exclusion violates the confrontation clause (though Olden
was not a rape shield case). Clearly, confrontation rights are now balanced against public policy (Craig), so the exclusion of some evidence
the defendant claims is exculpatory will not violate the constitution.
Thus, rape shields strike me as little different than other policy based
exclusions for hearsay, privilege, etc which are not usually aimed at a
specific category of offender (though I realize that state privilege law
is rapidly aiming at categories of defendants, blocked only when it
interferes with the right to cross examine).
What I do find disconcerting is that the dicta (thanks for small
favors) in the plurality leaves little doubt that Scalia sees the exclusion
of critical evidence which is trustworthy as being constitutional.
Although Egelhoff did not exclude the intoxication evidence, but only
prohibited its use on intent (to the extent jurors were not inclined to
resort to nullification, another lurking issue when we start tampering
with what jurors think is fair), the plurality left little doubt that complete exclusion of exculpatory evidence is ok when examined against
valid public policy. As some have already suggested, isn't public safety
always a good reason?
Hopefully, Chambers bashing will not obtain a majority, particularly since the Court cannot ignore Ron's valid criticism that contrary
to Justice Scalia's view, Chambers was not a case in which the evidentiary rulings were incorrect, but one in which correct rulings impinged on the defendant's right to defend himself by proving his
factual innocence. Yet Egelhoff will no doubt encourage the existing
tendency of trial and appellate courts to narrowly construe Chambers,
particularly since we all know how harmless error will smooth over
many a rough edge.
Ironically, the minimalist approach of the Court to the confrontation clause, virtually admitting all hearsay in shouting distance of a
firmly rooted hearsay exception, is now being mirrored in due process
analysis. Mimi noticed this link. After redefinition, the only remaining question is whether the exclusion of evidence violates a funda-
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mental principle of justice. Although both of these concepts
originally were used to benefit the criminal defendant-excluding
hearsay or limitations on cross that violated the confrontation clause
and admitting hearsay or otherwise inadmissible evidence of the defendant required by due process-the current analysis reaches the opposite result-letting in more evidence against the defendant that is
not subject to cross examination and keeping out evidence in favor of
the defendant I feel somewhat like Alice in the looking glass, or am I
missing something? I used to say that the constitution trumped over
conflicting evidentiary rules, now this advantage appears hollow.
A final thought on whether Winship is a dead letter. Long ago in
Patterson,the Court backed away from its broadest policy pronouncement We were told that the risk society must bear not to convict the
guilty is "not without limits" and that "due process does not require
that every conceivable step be taken, at whatever cost, to eliminate the
possibility of convicting an innocent person." But as long as juries are
told there is a presumption of innocence, whatever that means, Winship still lives. The underlying problem is that except when faced with
defendants who jurors can relate to, the presumption of innocence
has rarely had much content for defendants who are different than
the jurors, regardless of whether the difference relates to race, ethnicity, religion, poverty, criminal record or the expression of unpopular
views. Paradoxically, this makes the Winship requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt even more important in criminal cases. As
long as Egeihoff is interpreted as a decision about a state's ability to
redefine crime, it doesn't diminish current reasonable doubt analysis.
To the extent it hinders proof of factual innocence, Winship has taken
another hit. But, it may be that the Court has always been uneasy
when dealing with certain culpability issues, such as intoxication, competency and insanity, so these cases should not be construed as stating
general principles. I recognize that this conclusion may give more
comfort to those of us who teach evidence, than to those who teach
criminal law.
FROM: TIM O'NEiLL

I think Abner Green made some very valid points. The problem
is that Montana is pretending that they care about mens rea in murder when they really are saying that "If the defendant was drunk, don't
worry about mens rea."
Take a look at pages 846-848 of George Fletcher's Rethinking CriminalLaw. He discusses a German statute which has an interesting approach which skirts the issue of whether someone who is dead drunk
has the mens rea for some substantive crime. Instead, it creates a new
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offense-committing a wrongful act after intentionally or negligently
getting intoxicated. It treats "getting drunk" as the actus reus, "intentionally or negligently" as the mens rea for getting drunk, and the
"wrongful act" is merely the result which triggers prosecution. This
strikes me as a lot more intellectually honest than the legerdemain of
Egelhoff or the ridiculous "specific intent/general intent" distinction.
FROM: FRANK BowMAN

The comments of Ron Allen and others on the constitutional tangles created by the Egelhoff opinion as it was written, are penetrating
and well-taken, but a careful examination of the Montana Criminal
Code suggests that its treatment of intoxication in homicide crimes in
fact presents no serious constitutional issue, and therefore that the
Supreme Court need never have sown the thicket of difficulties that
will now inevitably arise from Egelhoff Put plainly, the U.S. Supreme
Court (and the Montana Supreme Court, for that matter) simply misunderstood Montana homicide law, and because of that misunderstanding wrote an opinion that unnecessarily complicates broad
swathes of substantive and procedural criminal law.
To begin, both Justice Scalia's plurality opinion and Justice
O'Connor's dissent spend a good deal of space discussing the historical treatment of intoxication in criminal cases, and yet both either
obscure (Scalia) or omit altogether (O'Connor) a fundamental point
familiar to any first-year law student: The general, although certainly
not invariable, rule in both England and America is, and has been for
a long time, that intoxication may be raised as a defense to crimes
requiring a "specific intent," but is not a defense to "general intent"
crimes. Justice Scalia mentions the distinction in describing the evoluton of the common law away from a categorical prohibition against
any defense reliance on intoxication, but by the end of his opinion
one might be forgiven for concluding that the general/specific distinction had now faded into the mists of history in favor of, as he puts
it, "the 'new common law' rule-that intoxication may be considered
on the question of intent ....." As for Justice O'Connor, she flatly

misstates the condition of modem American law, saying, "Courts
across the country agreed that where a subjective mental state was an
element of the crime to be proved, the defense must be permitted to
show, by reference to intoxication, the absence of that element." Of
course, only a relatively few American jurisdictions permit introduction of intoxication to show the absence of all "subjective mental
states." The overwhelming majority observe something akin to the
specific intent/general intent dichotomy, or (as in Montana) bar intoxication evidence on the question of mental state altogether. Justice
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O'Connor's discovery of this supposed "agreement" between state
courts to admit intoxication evidence virtually without limit is particularly curious because her home state of Arizona has had, since 1980
(while she was still on the state court bench), a statute permitting the
defense of intoxication as to "intentional" crimes, but not as to offenses committed "knowingly," "recklessly," or with "criminal
negligence."
This odd conspiracy of obfuscation between Scalia and O'Connor
is of more than pedantic interest. The evolution and persistence of
the general/specific intent dichotomy in modem American law is of
particular significance in looking at the treatment of intoxication in
the Montana statutory scheme governing horricide. Professor Allen
and others have noted in passing that the Montana statute requires
for conviction of "deliberate homicide" proof that the defendant acted either purposely or knowingly, but both the Court and most commentators have missed several significant points.
First, almost all the comments I have seen so far assume implicitly
that in Montana "purposely" and "knowingly" have roughly the meaning ascribed to those terms by the Model Penal Code, in other words
that a killing done "purposely" means a killing done with a desire to
kill, and that killings committed "knowingly" involve acts performed
with the knowledge that they are "virtually certain" to cause death.
Even if the foregoing were an accurate definition of these terms
under Montana law (and as we will see in a moment, it is not), the
important point is that "purposely" (and other words like "intentionally" generally taken to have roughly the same meaning) is a specific
intent in the accepted taxonomy, while "knowingly" is a general intent. Thus, the Montana statute lumps together in a single homicide
category killings committed with general and specific intents.
This point is reinforced by a careful examination of the definition of "knowingly" in the Montana statute. In fact, the Montana legislature modified the Model Penal Code definition of "knowingly" in a
significant way. The Model Penal Code says a person acts "knowingly"
with respect to results when "he is aware that it is practically certain
that his conduct will cause such a result." In Montana, a person acts
"knowingly" when "the person is aware that it is highly probable that
the result will be caused by the person's conduct." Thus, the Montana definition of "knowingly" subsumes a good percentage of cases
that would elsewhere (and under the Model Penal Code) fall within
the accepted definition of "reckessness"-that is, action taken despite
a defendant's conscious recognition of a "substantial and unjustifiable
risk" that the prohibited result will occur.
The suspicion that Montana intended to include in the "know-
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ing" category much behavior categorized in modem codes as "reckless" hardens to certainty when we observe that, in Montana, there is
no such thing as reckless homicide. Instead, below deliberate homicide in the Montana homicide hierarchy are only "mitigated deliberate homicide," which is classic heat-of-passion manslaughter, and
negligent homicide, a crime penalizing objectively unreasonable behavior of a particularly "gross" or egregious kind.
Therefore, Justice Ginsburg and those who concur in her analysis
are correct that the Montana legislature has "redefined" the culpable
mental state for the most serious degree of homicide known to Montana courts, but it seems to me that Justice Ginsburg missed the true
character of that redefinition by focussing exclusively on the intoxication statute, which is only a single component of the overall project.
The principle "redefinition" occurred, not when the intoxication statute was adopted, but in 1973 when the Montana legislature consolidated the crimes of 1st and 2nd degree murder into the single
category of "deliberate homicide." Despite the veneer of modernity
created by the employment of the ALI-sanctioned terms of art "purposely" and "knowingly," the Montana homicide scheme is, in its essence, a re-creation of the common law of homicide. "Deliberate
homicide" embraces all volitional choices to engage in conduct recognized by the actor to present, at the least, a very high risk of death-in
short, something very like common law "malice." "Mitigated deliberate homicide" codifies the traditional heat of passion ground of mitigation. The only significant difference between Montana homicide
law in 1996, and the law of Massachusetts in 1850, or England in 1920,
is the addition of the category of "negligent homicide," which
criminalizes deadly high-risk conduct which was objectively unreasonable, even though the defendant may not have subjectively perceived
the risk at the time he acted.
Therefore, under Montana law, there is no form of homicide
which is, properly speaking, a specific intent crime. Deliberate homicide feels like a specific intent crime because the prosecution can,
should it wish, charge and prove purposeful conduct. But the minimally required culpable mental state for deliberate homicide is
"knowingly," which, as we have seen, means in Montana no more than
an aggravated form of recklessness. As a matter of logic, any proof by
the prosecution of a subjective desire to kill is evidentiary surplusage,
forensically useful but legally meaningless, akin to proving planning
activity in a state that does not require proof of premeditation.
This view of Montana homicide law casts the Egelhoff opinion in a
rather different light. The assumptions that frame the argument between Scalia and O'Connor, and which also undergird Ginsburg's rea-
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soning, run something like this: (1) The Montana deliberate
homicide statute requires proof of purposeful or knowing conduct.
(2) The required culpable mental state for deliberate homicide is
therefore akin to the types of "specific intent" as to which most American jurisdictions currently consider proof of intoxication logically and
legally relevant. (3) Therefore, in order to uphold the Montana intoxication statute, either we must conclude that it is constitutionally acceptable for a state to exclude evidence logically relevant to the
existence of an element of the crime (Scalia), or we must read the
Montana intoxication statute to "redefine" the culpable mental state
element of deliberate homicide from "purposely or knowingly" to
"purposely or knowingly, or while drunk" (Ginsburg). If the Court
had understood what it was looking at in the Montana homicide
scheme, and where that scheme fit in the historical development of
the criminal law, it could have held the Montana intoxication statute
constitutional, at least as applied to Egelhoff, without breaking a
sweat, and without ever facing the dilemma that makes the Egelhoff
opinion so potentially far-reaching.
In the first place, the Montana intoxication and homicide statutes, taken together and properly understood, reproduce almost exactly what I understand to have been the universal law at the dawn of
the Republic. Therefore, to find this statute unconstitutional, the
court would have to have found that the common law of homicide,
and its treatment of intoxication, as that law existed throughout the
country at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights was unconstitutional, or alternatively, that something happened in the ensuing two
hundred years to render this universally accepted component of the
law of crimes unconstitutional. The argument from the Egelhoff dissent is that the necessary something was the rise at around the time of
the adoption of the 14th Amendment of the "new common law rule"
permitting the use of intoxication evidence to disprove certain types
of mental states ("specific intent").
The fatal flaw in this argument is that, as far as excluding evidence, the Montana intoxication statute does nothing more than the
"new common law rule." Both rules exclude intoxication evidence in
cases involving "general intent" crimes. True, the "new common law"
rule permits such evidence where "deliberation," "premeditation," or
some other "specific" intent is an element of the crime. But, as we
have seen Montana has no such requirement. Historically, the "new
common law rule" regarding the limited admissibility of intoxication
evidence was a response to the subdivision of the old unitary crime of
murder into a hierarchy of criminally culpable killings distinguished
by the presence or absence of an increasing number of meticulously
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defined mental states. It seems to me hard to argue that Montana is at
liberty to jettison the now-familiar multi-level structure for the most
serious types of homicide, but that they are constitutionally prohibited
from dispensing with ancillary rules which grew up in service of the
discarded statutory model.
One can, of course, argue that the antiquity of a rule is no necessary defense to the claim that it violates due process. But it seems to
me that the Montana statute can be defended quite well without resort to the claims of history. I think a fair reading of the Montana
legislature's design is this: They did not say that, "Deliberate homicide can be committed purposely or knowingly, or while drunk." Nor
did they say that, "Deliberate homicide can be committed purposely
or knowingly, but as a matter of policy we choose to exclude from the
jury's consideration intoxication evidence which is logically relevant
to the existence of that statutorily defined mental state." Instead, I
think they said, "We define the culpable mental state for deliberate
homicide broadly to embrace any volitional choice to engage in conduct recognized by the actor to present a very high risk of death.
When culpable mental state is defined in this way, we simply don't
think that any degree of intoxication short of actual unconsciousness
would suffice to disprove it. Therefore, in our legislative judgment,
intoxication is logically, not legally (or rather legally because logically)
irrelevant."
It might be argued that this interpretation of the Montana intoxication statute is unsustainable because the statute is a general one,
applying not only to homicides, but to all other criminal offenses. One
might argue that my interpretation turns on the idiosyncracy of the
deliberate homicide statute, lumping together purposeful and knowing conduct in the definition of a single offense. It is harder (though
by no means impossible) to argue that intoxication is not logically relevant to proof of crimes whose mental state requirement is fulfilled
only by purposeful behavior. If there were indeed many such crimes
in Montana law, I would be obliged to argue either that the state legislature thought intoxication logically irrelevant to proof of purposefulness, or that the legislature intended the general intoxication statute
to have one meaning in homicide cases and another meaning in all
others. Neither of these are attractive positions. It turns out, however, that the culpable mental state for the most serious degree of
virtually every crime against persons in the Montana criminal code is
"purposely or knowingly." There are a number of crimes against persons whose culpable mental state is "knowingly," and others for which
the required mental state is negligence. There are a very few crimes
against persons in Montana with a culpable mental state of "pur-
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posely" or "with purpose," but they are genuine rarities. Read as a
whole, the Montana criminal code only reinforces the impression that
the state legislature has for some years resolutely and consistently defined the required mental state for the most heinous offenses in a way
virtually indistinguishable from common law "malice." Consequently,
it is hardly implausible to think that the legislature precluded the admission of intoxication evidence generally because they have defined
the required mental state for virtually every state crime in such a way
that intoxication can quite reasonably be considered logically irrelevant. I recognize that my view of Montana law involves the legislature
making a rule about what evidence is and is not relevant to proof of
particular crimes, and thus drags us back at least a short distance into
the thicket of Scalia's opinion. However, Scalia's misreading of the
Montana statute forces him into defending exclusion of evidence
which he concedes is logically relevant, and which his opponents are
able to characterize as critical, to proof of an essential element of the
crime. That seems to me a rather different thing than upholding a
legislative judgment that the evidence at issue is, in fact, irrelevant to
any element of the crime.
Moreover, one need not buy the idea that the Montana legislature actually believed that drunkenness is logically irrelevant to proof
of their new version of "malice" in order to avoid the thickets of Egelhoff. Because all the prosecution must prove in a Montana deliberate
homicide case is an aggravated form of recklessness, intoxication may
be prohibited as a defense because, as Lord Edmund-Davies said in
DPP v. Majewski, "[T]he drunkenness is itself an integral part of the
crime, as forming, together with the other unlawful conduct charged
against the defendant, a complex act of criminal recklessness." Without exploring here the well-known arguments against this reasoning,
it seems to me very hard to contend that Edmund-Davies' position is
so flawed that no legislature could constitutionally adopt his view.
If the reading of Montana law suggested here is correct, then justice Ginsburg's remark that "the State need not prove that the defendant 'purposely or knowingly cause[d] the death of another' . . . in a
purely subjective sense" is wrong and unnecessary. Justice Breyer's
sensible critique of Ginsburg's formulation loses its force. And Montana law does not, as Ron Allen fears, produce at least some number
of convictions where the probability that the defendant possessed the
required mental state is 0.0.
Ron Allen closes his remarks with the suggestion that Egelhoff
has dire implications for the balance between courts and legislatures
in the criminal law. As I understand his comments, he worries that a
rule which confers unfettered power on legislatures both to define
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crimes and to determine the way evidence is used to prove those
crimes undermines the historical role of courts in determining the
applicability of evidence to particular cases. His concern may well be
justified if the flawed reasoning of the Egelhoff opinion is applied and
expanded in other settings. But it may bear mentioning that the result of the particular statutory scheme sustained in Egelhoff is a net
transfer of power away from the legislature and to the courts. The
penalty for deliberate homicide under Montana law (absent a death
penalty proceeding) is 10 years to life. The choice of where in that
range to place the defendant appears to be almost entirely discretionary with the judge. In short, the practical effect of the Montana statute is to equate drunken killers with contract hit men in the purely
formal sense of convicting them of the same crime, but to place the
practical consequences of that conviction almost entirely in the hands
of ajudicial officer, who may, and almost certainly will, consider intoxication in sentencing. We may or may not consider this a good policy
choice, but it hardly represents a threat to the judicial-legislative
balance.
FROM: DIANE AMANN

Regarding:
a careful examination of the Montana Criminal Code suggests that its
treatment of intoxication in homicide crimes in fact presents no serious
constitutional issue, and therefore that the Supreme Court need never
have sown the thicket of difficulties that will now inevitably arise from
Egelhoff. Put plainly, the U.S. Supreme Court (and the Montana
Supreme Court, for that matter) simply misunderstood Montana homicide law, and because of that misunderstanding wrote an opinion that
unnecessarily complicates broad swathes of substantive and procedural
criminal law.
I am on my way away for the holiday and so have no time to
double check this, but will offer it for consideration/confirmation: it
is my recollection that because of the ambiguity caused by the disjunctive language in the Montana deliberate homicide statute, Montana
courts had interpreted it to require a state of mind analogous to specific intent/purposefulness, notwithstanding the "knowingly" language. That seemed to be the premise from which the litigants, and,
therefore, the Court, worked.
BowMAN
I will defer immediately to any experienced Montana criminal
lawyer who disagrees, but I've taken another look at Montana caselaw
in light of Diane's recollections and I really can't find anything to
support the view that Montana courts have somehow turned "deliberFROM: FRANK
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ate homicide" under 45-5-102 into a "specific intent" crime despite
plain statutory language saying that the prosecution can prove either
purposeful OR knowing conduct, and defining "knowingly" as, in effect, aggravated recklessness.
In the first place, I have been unable to find any case that substantiates the suggestion that Montana courts have judicially converted the disjunctive "or" into the conjunctive, thus somehow
eliminating the option of proving only that a defendant acted "knowingly." The Montana Supreme Court says nothing to that effect in its
Egelhoff opinion. Indeed, although there are some passages in the
Montana Supreme Court's Egelhoff opinion where the phrases "knowingly or purposely" and "knowingly and purposely" are used interchangeably, the concurrence of Justice Nelson makes clear that
purposely and knowingly are "two mental states." State v. Egelhoff, 900
P.2d 260, 268 (Mont. 1995).
More probative on the point, however, is State v. Leyba, 915 P.2d
794 (Mont. 1996). There, the Montana Supreme Court wrote: "We
have stated: 'The State need not establish a specific purpose to kill."'
(citing State v. Weinberger, 665 P.2d 202, 208-09 (Mont. 1983)). In
Leyba, the defendant raised, among other points, the issue of sufficiency of evidence to establish his culpable mental state for the crime
of deliberate homicide. The court said nothing about the prosecution
being required to establish purposefulness. To the contrary, it upheld
the conviction saying, "There was sufficient evidence for the jury to
find that Leyba acted knowingly, because even if death was not the
intended result, he was aware of the high probability that such a result
would be caused by his conduct." Id. at 799.
I suspect that some confusion may have been caused by the earlier case of State v. Rothacher, 901 P.2d 82 (Mont. 1995), decided in
August 1995. Rothacher is a convoluted opinion whose nuances are
beyond the scope of this discussion, but read carefully, it is an opinion
about a badly worded jury instruction concerning the meaning of
"purposely." Nowhere does it alter the definition of knowingly, or
eliminate the prosecutorial option of proving deliberate homicide by
establishing knowing conduct. If there were ever any doubt on the
point, Leyba laid them to rest (and did so 6 weeks before Egelhoff was
argued in the U.S. Supreme Court).
Again, I am open to correction from those who know better, and
if Diane is right I will retire in embarrassment from the field. But my
concededly quick foray into Montana case law leaves me convinced
that "deliberate homicide" in Montana is now, and always has been, a
general intent crime, as that term has been traditionally understood.

